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 At the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a decision-
making technique called “systems analysis” was perfected and began to be applied 
broadly to matters of national defense strategy and government policy. The brain child of 
the RAND Corporation, systems analysis extended the logic of “operations research,” 
which had been developed during World War II, from its earlier narrow focus on weapon 
systems to broader matters of defense strategy, government, and social policy. The 
systems analytic approach, as its name suggests, would focus on a particular social 
system, identify the objectives of that particular system, and compare and evaluate the 
possible alternative ways of optimizing those objectives.  
 
Systems analysis had a formative impact on government decision-making and on 
the field of public policy. In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara imposed 
the method of systems analysis broadly on defense department decision-making, from 
weapon systems procurement to national defense strategy, under the rubric of “Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting Systems analysis” or “PPBS.” Within a few years, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson directed his budget director to implement PPBS throughout all 
federal agencies, extending the reach of systems analytic methods throughout the federal 
government. A series of executive orders under Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, 
and Bill Clinton would further entrench the use of systems analytic techniques, as would 
developments in schools of public policy.  
 
Systems analysis would also significantly shape the field of criminal justice. It is 
largely responsible for crystalizing the notion of a “criminal justice system” that, today, 
grounds practically all research and practice in the area. Because of this, systems analysis 
had an important influence on the field of criminal law and criminal procedure. It 
contributed to a significant shift away from viewing the criminal sanction as an exercise 
of sovereign right to viewing it instead within a systems analytic framework. Relatedly, it 
influenced and helped shape a style of judicial decision-making and legal reasoning.  
 
Precisely when systems analysis was in crescendo in the 1960s, a number of 
judges and legal scholars began to embrace a systems analytic approach to judicial 
decision-making and legal reasoning. It is an approach that assumes the existence of a 
“criminal justice system,” with particular functions and objectives, and that orients itself 
toward optimizing those systemic objectives. The approach can take either of two forms: 
(1) what I would call an “internal” approach in which the judicial decision-maker views 




an integral part of the “criminal justice system” and consequently tries to optimize the 
functioning of that integrated system with the objective, say, of controlling crime, 
improving the efficient management of populations, or otherwise enhancing the 
functionality of the system; and (2) what I would call an “external” form in which the 
judicial decision-maker views him or herself and other legal actors as outsiders to the 
“criminal justice system” and consequently defers to the actors within the system (such as 
the police, corrections officials, parole board, etc.).  
 
 The reliance on systems analytic reasoning in criminal law and criminal 
procedure, however, reproduces a number of the technical weaknesses of systems 
analysis. More specifically, the adoption of a systems analytic approach privileges 
systems-related interests, particularly the more quantifiable ones, over the competing 
concerns that are at issue in the context of the criminal sanction—and it does so under the 
guise of neutral and objective science. In elevating systems-related interests over other 
values, it produces a false dichotomy between objective system needs and subjective 
values that is fundamentally corrosive to the decision-making process and to the larger 
social outcomes, because it prevents a full articulation, open discussion, and 
comprehensive weighing of the values that ground our constitutional union.  
 
Exploring the influence of systems analytic reasoning on criminal law and 
procedure and identifying the specific flaws of systems analysis may allow us to move 
beyond this problematic style of judicial decision-making. Specifically, by thinking 
critically about the technical weaknesses of systems analysis, we may be able to move 
past the systems analytic approach toward a more capacious and promising way to 
theorize and resolve matters of crime and punishment: a way forward that would 
effectively discard the misleading notion of a “criminal justice system” in order to 
embrace a wider consideration of the values that are implicated by the criminal sanction.  
 
 
I.  THE EMERGENCE AND RISE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
 
Military weapon systems analysis, or what was originally called “Operations 
Research,” or simply “OR,” was developed during World War II as a way to “provide 
quantitative aids to defense decision makers” with the goal of “optimizing the operational 
employment of existing weapons (or other military) systems.”2 The “distinctive 
approach,” according to the Operational Research Society of Great Britain, was “to 
develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating measurements of factors such as 
change and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcomes of alternative 
decisions, strategies or controls.”3 Famous early applications of operations research 
2 Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 6. 
3 In the United Kingdom, where OR largely originated, it was called “operational research.” This definition 




                                                          
included studies of the placement and use of aircraft-detection radar devices and of anti-
submarine tactics involving depth-charge explosions in the early phases of the Second 
World War.4 Eventually, operations research would apply the same mathematical 
algorithms and models to larger management problems, such as the efficient 
determination of transportation routes or warehouse stock control.5 From this larger 
perspective, operations research can best be understood, again in the words of the 
Operational Research Society of Great Britain, as “the attack of modern science on 
complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men, 
machines, materials and money in industry, business, government and defense…. The 
purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically.”6 The only 
question is how to optimize efficiency where the measure of efficiency is clearly defined, 
or, as Edward S. Quade of the RAND Corporation would explain, how “to increase the 
efficiency of a man-machine system in a situation where it is clear what ‘more efficient’ 
means.”7  
During the 1950s, Quade, Alain Enthoven, Charles Hitch, and others at the 
RAND Corporation would extend this method of analysis from the narrow field of 
operations research, where it had originated, to defense strategy more broadly—
essentially, from deciding, for instance, the optimal altitude for a bombing mission to 
determining broader nuclear engagement policies. The broader application would become 
known as “Systems Analysis.” Systems analysis was often confused with operations 
research, from which it evolved, but it was distinct in several regards. Operations 
research tended to have more elaborate mathematical models and solved lower level 
problems;8 in systems analysis, by contrast, the pure mathematical computation was 
generally applied only to subparts of the overall problem. Moreover, systems analysis 
took on larger strategic questions that implicate choices between major policy options. In 
this sense, systems analysis was, from its inception, “less quantitative in method and 
more oriented toward the analysis of broad strategic and policy questions, [...] 
particularly […] seeking to clarify choice under conditions of great uncertainty.”9 
 
 
(1962), available in the Glossary of Cybernetics and Systems 
http://www.wata.cc/forums/uploaded/136_1167433681.pdf. For a history of Operations Research, see 
Maurice W. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to 
1970, Imperial College Press 2003; S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War 
Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
4 Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, pp. 6-7. 
5 Edward S. Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting. Santa Monica, 
Calif.: Rand Corp., 1966; p. 3. 
6 Operational Research Quarterly, 13(3): 282 (1962). 
7 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 3.  
8 Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, p. 8.  




                                                                                                                                                                             
A. The Logic of Systems Analysis 
The logic of systems analysis is simple and was depicted, most clearly, in a 
RAND model, Figure 1 of Edward Quade’s RAND Report P-3322 on “Systems Analysis 
Techniques for Planning-Programming-Budgeting” from March 1966.10 Quade’s 
graphics capture best the five key steps of the analytic decision-making method 
developed in the 1950s and 60s—a method that privileged quantification, modeling, 
statistical analysis, and a cost-benefit approach.  
By way of background and motivating the model, the decision-maker had to have 
identified a particular problem to address within a particular social sphere—or 
“system”—and to have a clear idea of the system’s objectives. With the objectives in 
mind, the decision-maker would then set the proper criterion to evaluate different 
promising policy alternatives. There would be five steps to the process: 
 
Step 1, the input, is the set of promising policy alternatives, each of which could 
possibly advance the objectives of the system. Each alternative policy is then filtered 
through a model or a set of models to assess its individual attributes in terms, for 
example, of maintenance costs, manpower requirements, communication capabilities, etc. 
This produces each policy’s level of effectiveness and cost, which can then be compared 
using a metric, “the criterion,” which will turn out, as the output, the relative rank of each 
policy compared to the others. The output, in the far right column at step 5, is the correct 
10 Edward S. Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting. Santa Monica, 




                                                          
ordinal ranking of the policy alternatives—or what is, in effect, a full ranking of “The 
ALTERNATIVES in order of Preference.”11  
In order to perfect the method, the operation can be reiterated, testing for 
sensitivity, questioning assumptions, reexamining objectives, exploring new alternatives, 




Edward Quade of the RAND Corporation would present his model of a policy-
machine—or, in his words, what “is frequently called a cost-effectiveness analysis… or, 
alternatively, cost-utility and cost-benefit analyses”13—to federal bureaucrats in a course 
titled “Executive Orientation in Planning, Programming, and Budgeting” sponsored by 
the United States Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service Commission in late 
February 1966. “Our purpose,” Quade emphasized, “is to discuss the question of 
11 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 9.  
12 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, pp. 10-11. 




                                                          
extending military systems analysis to the civilian activities of the government.”14 Quade 
would offer this concise definition of systems analysis: 
A systems analysis is an analytic study designed to help a decision maker identify 
a preferred choice among possible alternatives. It is characterized by a systematic 
and rational approach, with assumptions made explicit, objectives and criteria 
clearly defined, and alternative courses of action compared in the light of their 
possible consequences. An effort is made to use quantitative methods but 
computers are not essential. What is essential is a model that enables expert 
intuition and judgment to be applied efficiently.15 
As this definition makes clear, there are two connotations to the term “systems” 
embedded in systems analysis: first, there is the idea that there exists a subset of practices 
and institutions that relate to each other as a “system” and that need to be analyzed 
separately from other social practices and institutions. Along this first dimension, the 
analysis focuses on a particular system—such as health care or criminal justice—in order 
to optimize its functionality. Second, there is the notion of “systems analysis” that 
involves a particular type of analysis—concerning a model and criterion—of an 
identified social problem. Though they can be distinguished, these two connotations are 
imbricated and are both integral parts of the systems analytic approach: the central idea, 
in effect, is to choose a policy that will maximize the functionality of a system.  
B. The Expansion of Systems Analysis 
Secretary of Defense McNamara would impose systems analysis under the rubric 
of “Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems” analysis on all military procurement and 
defense strategy immediately upon taking office under President Kennedy in 1961. That 
first round of expansion—from narrow operations research on weapons systems to 
broader applications of systems analysis of defense strategy—generated a lot of 
resistance within the military establishment, targeted primarily at the controversial figure 
of McNamara himself. But, in Quade’s opinion, by 1966 “there ha[d] been substantial 
progress, and the years since 1961 have seen a marked increase in the extent to which 
analysis of policy and strategy have influenced decisionmakers on the broadest issues of 
national defense.”16 President Lyndon B. Johnson would expand the reach of systems 
analysis even further, announcing in a statement to members of his cabinet and heads of 
federal executive agencies on August 25, 1965, that he had directed his budget director, 
Charles Schultze, to implement the new PPBS method throughout all federal agencies. 
Johnson emphasized that the new method would “identify national goals with precision 
and on a continuing basis,” help “search for alternative means of reaching those goals 
most effectively at the least cost,” and accurately “measure the performance of programs 
14 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2. 
15 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 28. 




                                                          
to insure a dollars worth of service for each dollar spent.”17 Through a further series of 
executive orders, Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton would 
eventually expand the use of systems analysis, requiring all executive agencies to make 
economic impact studies of all major government regulations.18  
This expansion of systems analysis to all governmental decision-making was 
significant—or, in Edward Quade’s words, “possibly even more radical” than the earlier 
development of operations research.19 It carried the possibility of major repercussions. As 
Quade explained, alternative policies are not always “obvious substitutes for one 
another,” nor do they always “perform the same specific function.”20 Nevertheless, he 
observed, “education, antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum clearance may 
all be alternatives in combating juvenile delinquency.”21 Any one of them could be called 
for by PPBS analysis. Moreover, systems analysis could give us the tools to decide 
whether, as Quade noted, “additional money might be better spent on space exploration 
or economic opportunity programs”;22 or whether to “reduce unemployment to less than 
2% in two years or add a certain number of miles to the interstate highway system.”23 In 
effect, according to its proponents, systems analysis would allow policy-makers to put 
aside partisan politics, personal preferences, subjective values, and overinflated 
expectations. As a colleague at RAND and later Secretary of Defense, James R. 
Schlesinger, would explain: “[Systems analysis] eliminates the purely subjective 
approach on the part of devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of 
argument. They must talk about reality rather than morality.”24 With systems analysis, 
Schlesinger argued, there was no longer any need for political wrangling, for value 
judgments, nor for practical experience—in effect, no need for Aristotelian virtues such 
as phronesis, nor for Machiavellian notions of virtù. The right answer emerged from the 
machine-model that evaluates cost and effectiveness; all that was needed was a narrow 
and precise objective. 
C. The Influence of Systems Analysis on the Study of Public Policy  
 It is fair to say that, today, the method of systems analysis has entered the 
mainstream of public policy analysis, has been generalized, and has become somewhat 
second-nature. What was once technical systems analysis has become, today, the 
17 United States General Accounting Office, Survey of progress in implementing the planning-
programming-budgeting system in executive agencies; report to the Congress, Washington, DC. 1969, p. 4.  
18 See President Carter’s executive order E.O. 12044 (tasking all executive agencies with the duty to 
conduct economic impact studies of all major government regulations); President Reagan’s executive order 
E.O. 12291 (assigning the responsibility to the Office of Management and Budget); President Bill Clinton’s 
executive order E.O. 12866 (on the “Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations” (1996)). 
19 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2. 
20 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 7. 
21 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 7. 
22 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 18. 
23 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, pp. 4-5. 





                                                          
canonical approach to public policy. As Edward Rubin observes, “The components of an 
optimal public policymaking process are well known and generally agreed upon”25: they 
include, first, selecting a problem, second, finding the range of alternative policies, third 
assessing each one, and fourth, ranking them—or, in Rubin’s own words: 
First, the decision maker should define the problem to be solved. The next step is 
to generate a range of possible alternatives that might potentially resolve the 
problem. Each alternative is then assessed for its potential effectiveness on the 
basis of the available information. Then the decision maker chooses the most 
promising alternative; the more information and analysis that can be brought to 
bear on the decision, the more likely it will be that the most effective alternative 
will be selected. Once the choice is made, it must be implemented…26 
This is, of course, a more informal but exact articulation of the RAND model. 
And it is generally considered the “optimal” public policymaking process, according to 
leading public policy figures, including Eugene Bardach, Thomas Birkland, John 
Friedman, Lewis Zekhauser, and Deborah Stone.27 As Rubin emphasizes, it is “the 
decision making sequence that is widely recognized in our society as the most promising 
way to make public policy.”28  
Stone and Zekhauser set forth the sequence as follows in their canonical text on 
public policy analysis, A Primer for Policy Analysis:29  
1. Establishing the Context. What is the underlying problem that must be dealt 
with? What specific objectives are to be pursued in confronting this problem? 
2. Laying Out the Alternatives. What are the alternative courses of action? What 
are the possibilities for gathering further information? 
3. Predicting the Consequences. What are the consequences of each of the 
alternative actions? What techniques are relevant for predicting these 
consequences? If outcomes are uncertain, what is the estimated likelihood of 
each? 
4. Valuing the Outcomes. By what criteria should we measure success in 
pursuing each objective? Recognizing that inevitably some alternatives will be 
25 Edward L. Rubin, “Public Policy and the Methodology of Statutory Design,” work-in-progress draft 
dated September 9, 2013, presented at the Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop at Columbia 
Law School on Monday, September 30, 2013, draft p. 38. 
26 Rubin, 2013, p. 38. Rubin fleshes out this schema in step-by-step detail on pages 49 through 60 of his 
draft. More simply, though, he writes: the public policy approach “define[s] the problem, generate[s] 
alternatives, evaluate[s] at least the most promising alternatives, and reach[es] a decision on the basis of 
that evaluation.” Id., at p. 39.  
27 See Rubin, 2013, p. 38 n. 151.  
28 Rubin, 2013, p. 40. 




                                                          
superior with respect to certain objectives and inferior with respect to others, 
how should different combinations of valued objectives be compared with one 
another? 
5. Making a Choice. Drawing all aspects of the analysis together, what is the 
preferred course of action?30 
Underlying this approach and its generalization, there is an idea that in practically 
all domains there is a policy space within which it is possible to use this policy method to 
achieve better results, to be more effective, to get it right—or, in Rubin’s words, to “do a 
better job in that inevitable social engineering in which we engage in all the time.”31 
What the policy approach does is to try to magnify the policy space in order to 
incrementally improve decision-making—in the very same way in which systems 
analysis tried to extend its reach from the narrow confines of military operations research 
to the entire administrative state. As Rubin writes: “the more information and analysis 
that can be brought to bear on the decision, the more likely it will be that the most 
effective alternative will be selected.”32 What is clear is that systems analytic approaches 
have shaped the contemporary study of public policy. They would also shape the study of 
crime and punishment.  
 
II.  SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
During the Progressive Era, reformers had already gravitated toward the notion of 
systems, especially with regard to the treatment of juvenile offenders. One of the first 
uses of the term “criminal justice system” occurred in a 1939 report on Youth in the Toils, 
a study conducted on behalf of The Delinquency Committee of the New York City Boys 
Bureau, an organization that addressed the problems of homeless youth. In the 
immediately following years, the expression “criminal justice system” would be used in 
several other publications, each time to refer again to the issue of juvenile delinquency. 
The expression was used, for instance, in a 1941 issue of Federal Probation,33 a 1942 
issue of the American Bar Association Journal titled “The Criminal Youth Problem,”34 
and a 1942 article in Law and Contemporary Problems, “Existing Provisions for the 
Correction of Youthful Offenders.”35  
30 Stockey and Zeckhauser, 1978, pp. 5-6.  
31 Rubin comments at Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop, September 30, 2013. 
32 Rubin, p. 38. 
33 John R. Ellingston, “Protecting Our Children from Criminal Careers,” Federal Probation, Vol. 5(4):62, 
1940. 
34 Orrie L. Phillips, “The Criminal Youth Problem,” American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 28(9):582, 
1942.  
35 Austin H. MacCormick, “Existing Provisions for the Correction of Youthful Offenders,” Law and 




                                                          
But these loose references to a criminal justice system would gain new analytic 
power with the emergence of systems analysis, such that, by the second half of the 
twentieth century, the field of criminal justice began to be understood as a relatively 
enclosed system in which particular sets of actors (policemen, prosecutors, judges, 
probation officers, correctional guards, wardens, parole board members, etc.) operate a 
defined set of institutions (police, courts, jails, prisons, parole supervision, etc.) to 
promote a distinct set of systems objectives (crime control, population management, 
service needs, etc.) and to produce a functioning structure of criminal justice. 
Systems analysis played an important role in crystalizing the notion of a “criminal 
justice system.” A genealogic link can be traced at both the individual and institutional 
levels. Alfred Blumstein, for instance, a towering figure in American criminology, 
himself began as an operations researcher and was president of the Operations Research 
Society of America (ORSA)—and tellingly, his appointment at Carnegie Mellon is as 
University Professor of Urban Systems and Operations Research.  
In a fascinating memoire titled “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal 
Justice System,”36 Blumstein refers to himself as an “OR Missionary” and traces his 
missionary activities in the area of criminal justice. Reflecting back on his trajectory, 
Blumstein would write that “the missionary function was an important role of OR, and so 
I encouraged OR folks to look to missionary opportunities. That was well before I 
immersed myself fully in missionary activity with the criminal justice system.”37 
Blumstein viewed his “missionary role,” in his own words, as “bringing OR perspectives 
to the ‘heathens’ in a particular domain—those who have not yet adopted quantification, 
modeling, system perspectives, and planning that characterize the hallmark of OR.”38  
Blumstein was not alone. As he observed, “there have been many other OR 
people, particularly Arnold Barnett, Jon Caulkins, Jan Chaiken, Peter Greenwood, 
Richard Larson, and Michael Maltz, who have had their own experiences with the CJS 
[criminal justice system], and many of them have received honors from the OR 
community as well as the CJS community.”39 A lengthy and useful review of OR 
contributions to the criminal justice system is provided in Michael Maltz’s 1994 chapter 
on “Operations research in studying crime and justice: Its history and 
accomplishments.”40  
36 Alfred Blumstein, “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal Justice System,” Operations Research, 
55(1):14-23 (2007).  
37 Blumstein, “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal Justice System,” 2007, p. 14. 
38 Blumstein, 2007, p. 14. 
39 Blumstein, 2007, p. 22. 
40 Michael Maltz, “Operations research in studying crime and justice: Its history and accomplishments,” in 
Stephen Pollock, Michael Rothkopf, Arnold Barnett, eds. Operations Research in the Public Sector, Vol. 6. 





                                                          
But one could also trace an institutional genealogy and locate it right here in New 
York City during the 1970s. 
A. The New York City RAND Institute 
John Lindsay was elected mayor of New York City in 1966 and took office 
promising to reform city government with more efficient cost-benefit budgeting—
specifically, with Planning-Programming-Budgeting System analysis. Mayor Lindsay 
intended to bring the new PPBS technique to New York City “to improve budgeting and 
operations.”41  
At the time, violent crime in the City was on the rise.42 The crime problem was 
particularly acute in public housing projects and so-called “welfare hotels.”43 Mayor 
Lindsay invited the RAND Corporation to develop new strategies to reduce and prevent 
crime; and within a few years, Lindsay had helped establish the New York City RAND 
Institute as a joint project of the City and RAND Corporation.44  
In January 1968, Mayor Lindsay hailed New York City’s new arrangement with 
the RAND Corporation to tackle crime prevention in the City: 
This agreement will greatly assist our introduction into city 
agencies of the kind of streamlined, modern management 
thinking that Robert McNamara applied in the Pentagon 
with such success during the past seven years. ... I regard 
this as the most important development in the search for ef-
fectiveness in city government in many, many years.45 
With crime on the rise, the primary focus of the RAND satellite would be the 
New York City Police Department. At a news conference on January 8, 1969, Mayor 
Lindsay and Henry Rowen, the president of RAND and previously Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense under McNamara, unveiled the new project with great fanfare: an 
41 Jennifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War 
America. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003) at p. 67. For an excellent history of the 
emergence of these techniques and rationalities, see S.M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: 
The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).  
42 By the early 1970s, violent crime in New York City had increased sharply, with homicide rates up an 
order of magnitude from around 4 per 100,000 inhabitants in the early 1960s to over 19 per 100,000 by 
1972. See FBI Uniform Crime Reports for New York City (rate of murder and non-negligent manslaughter 
per 100,000 residents).  
43 See, e.g., Jack Rosenthal, “Housing Study: High Rise = High Crime,” New York Times, October 26, 
1972; Max H. Seigel, “Welfare-Hotel Crime Is a Local Problem,” New York Times, November 19, 1972; 
Joseph B. Treaster, “A Growing Cloud of Fear Darkens a Brooklyn Project,” New York Times, March 22, 
1975. Crime was becoming a major topic of media attention and political races. See Richard F. Shepard, 
“Poll Finds Added Worry On Crime and Its Control,” New York Times, October 29, 1974; David Burnham, 
“Most Call Crime City’s Worst Ill,” New York Times, January 16, 1974. 
44 Light, From Warfare to Welfare, 2003, pp. 68-72. 




                                                          
initial contract with the City worth $607,000, a Madison Avenue office “staffed by 40 
economists, sociologists, engineers, cost analysts and other researchers,” and four focus 
areas, the most important of which would be the NYPD (the other three being the fire 
department, housing administration, and health services).46 Everyone expected a tight 
collaboration. As the New York Times suggested, “The city’s relationship with RAND 
would be similar to the one RAND has had with the Air Force since World War II”47—
one could hardly imagine a tighter relationship than that.  
Once established, the New York City RAND Institute immediately began to 
tackle the crime problem with a number of reports and recommendations about how to 
improve the efficiency of police services. The first series of reports were extremely 
narrow operations research-type reports, with titles such as “A Hypercube Queueing 
Model for Facility Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services” (Richard C. 
Larson, R-1238-HUD, 1973), “Response of Emergency Units: The Effects of Barriers, 
Discrete Streets, and One-Way Streets” (Richard C. Larson, R-675-HUD, 1971), 
“Allocation of Emergency Units Response Areas” (Jan M. Chaiken, P-4745, 1971), 
“Analysis of the Night and Weekend Arraignment Parts in the Bronx and Queens 
Criminal Courts” (John B. Jennings, R-1236-NYS, 1973), “Using Simulation To Develop 
and Validate Analytical Emergency Service Deployment Models” (Edward Ignall, Peter 
Kolesar, and Warren Walker, P-5463, 1975), and “Determining the Travel Characteristics 
of Emergency Service Vehicles” (J. Hausner, R-1687-HUD, 1975). These studies applied 
complex mathematical models to examine minute dispatching and routing efficiencies. 
They resembled the classic early applications of operations research outside the military 
to matters such as determining “how Post Office pick-up trucks should be routed to 
collect mail from deposit boxes, or whether computers should be rented or purchased, or 
what type of all-weather landing system should be installed in new commercial 
aircraft.”48  
Gradually and interspersed in these operation research-type reports, there emerged 
a number of systems analysis-type studies. The contours of the approach were captured 
well by the New York Times in 1968 when it defined it as the “method of analyzing a 
problem by listing the desired objectives and available resources and then detailing al-
ternative methods of using the resources to accomplish the objectives.”49 RAND’s 
systems analytic studies did indeed focus on a narrow objective—preventing crime—and 
they would embrace a wide range of different alternative policies to try to determine the 
most efficient. And so, within a few years, with crime on the rise and a ready method at 
hand, RAND and the NYC RAND Institute were deeply involved in problem-solving 
crime in public housing using a systems analysis approach.  
46 Reeves, New York Times, January 10, 1969, p. 31; Jennifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare : Defense 
Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold War America, 2003, pp. 68-70. 
47 Reeves, New York Times, January 10, 1969, p. 31. 
48 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 18. 








B. Liechenstein’s 1971 RAND Report  
An illustrative study was Michael I. Liechenstein’s report issued in June 1971, 
which addressed the objective of, as the title suggests, “Reducing Crime in Apartment 
Dwellings: A Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives.”50 The study, which 
was sponsored by Mayor Lindsay’s Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, analyzed 
techniques for improving security in New York City Housing Authority buildings. It took 
a “broad operational view of a security system,”51 analyzing fifteen alternative policies, 
including tenant training and education, tenant patrols, tenant qualifications to live in the 
projects, extended recreational opportunities for teenagers, rent rebates, elaborate 
building-entry restrictions, locked lobbies, intrusion detectors, weapon detectors, 
surveillance, and increased police or guard manning.  
In order to compare the alternatives, the study developed “effectiveness criteria” 
and then coupled those to “compatibility and cost criteria to derive estimates of an overall 
figure of merit (e.g., the ration of effectiveness-to-cost with a constraint on either 
minimum effectiveness or maximum cost).”52 In addition to the security effectiveness 
and compatibility criteria, the report also listed cost-benefit criteria: “Research and 
development cost (equipment, maintenance, administration before production); Capital 
cost (equipment, maintenance, and administrative costs during production); Operating 
cost (equipment, maintenance, administration costs during use); Scrap value (residual 
value at end of use); Expected total benefit.”53  
The report generated a graph of the cost-effectiveness of all fifteen alternatives: 
50 Michael I. Liechenstein, Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings: A Methodology for Comparing 
Security Alternatives (New York, NY: The New York City-Rand Institute, June 1971) P-4656. 
51 Liechenstein, Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings, 1971, p. 3. 
52 Liechenstein, Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings, 1971, p. 5. 




                                                          
 
The fifteen different measures ranged the political spectrum—from education for 
low-income project tenants on issues of criminal offending, preventive measures, and 
self-defense, to providing recreational facilities for poor urban teenagers, to offering 
subsidies and other positive financial incentives to poor tenants, to raising admissibility 
and tenure standards for housing assistance, to increasing police presence. They included 
everything from education, to recreation, to target-hardening, to policing. Based on the 
quantitative analysis, the report concluded that the most cost-effective preventive 
measure was an increased police force and more guard-manning.  
This was, one could say, the pinnacle of systems analytics in relation to the 
criminal justice system. For RAND, the “criminal justice system” was a natural space for 
systems analytics. To be sure, part of the attraction of systems analysis talk at an 
institution like the New York City RAND Institute was an artifact of the consultancy 
business; and the NYC RAND Institute in fact folded in 1975 amidst significant—I might 
add, ironic—controversy over Lindsay’s profligate spending on consultants.54 But 
nevertheless, the notion of “the criminal justice system” would stick and the systems 
analytic approach would become increasingly important. It would lead to a whole set of 
institutions and think tanks, across the political spectrum, that would take as its object the 




                                                          
criminal justice system—such as the Vera Institute of Justice, the Urban Institute, the 
Institute for Law and Justice, the Police Foundation, the Police Executive Research 
Forum, to name a few. These organizations would centrally embrace the notion of 
“systems.” The Vera Institute’s very logo is “Making justice systems fairer and more 
effective through research and innovation.”55 And systems analytic types of methods and 
reasoning would continue to develop, including importantly in cases like the 
COMPSTAT approach in New York City.   
Today, the idea that there is a “criminal justice system” has become so dominant 
that practically everyone thinks about crime and punishment through a systems analytic 
lens and uses the language and logic of systems in a natural and reflexive way. We are so 
deeply entrenched in this view of criminal justice that it is practically redundant to 
observe that we conceive of the area in terms of a system. It is practically impossible 
today to work or speak in the area without referring to it as the “criminal justice system.” 
The systems approach that crystalized in the 1960s dominates our way of thinking about 
the field today.  
 
C. CJS-Systems Analysis in Context 
Systems analytic reasoning in the area of criminal justice fits within a family of 
consequentialist justifications, insofar as it focuses on affecting an outcome (for example, 
crime reduction, efficient population management, etc.) It may be important to 
distinguish between different approaches here that bear family resemblances: 
1. Behavioral prevention theory, namely the idea that the goal of the criminal 
sanction is to reform the individual so that he is no longer dangerous 
(rehabilitation) and to protect the society by a mixture of incapacitation and 
treatment of the offender.  
2. Utilitarian deterrence theory, namely the idea that the goal of the criminal 
sanction is to deter the individual offender (specific deterrence) and to deter 
other potential offenders through the sanction.  
3. Crime control systems analysis, namely the idea that the goal of the criminal 
sanction is to reduce crime using the most cost-effective means.  
Each of these is outcome oriented in the sense that they each are intended to 
maximize or at least promote a social good—by contrast, say, to a retributive theory that 
seeks only to punish someone as a just desert for a wicked act. In this sense, they are all 
sub-types of utilitarianism. But the third, systems analysis, is more capacious and less 
means driven, less wedded to any particular mechanism (particular treatments or forms of 
deterrence). Systems analysis, in a sense, is the umbrella theory under which both 
behavioral and traditional deterrence policies could be implemented. From a systems 




                                                          
analysis perspective, both the behavioral and deterrence theories jump the gun: for a 
systems analyst, the question is to figure out which treatment is the most cost-effective.  
Now, the systems analytic approach could be called, broadly speaking, 
“utilitarian” in the sense that it is effectively trying to maximize a welfare outcome. But I 
think it would be fairer to say, instead, that systems analysis is a subset of a utilitarian 
framework, since the systems analysis approach does not set, as its objective, to 
maximize social welfare, but rather to most efficiently achieve the objectives associated 
with a system. It does not weigh that or those objectives against other social desiderata. It 
does not concern itself with the question how crime reduction, say, compares to cancer 
research, to highway construction, etc., so long as the latter are not policy alternatives 
that are being considered and compared in the analysis. Systems analysis, in effect, 
shoots for a partial equilibrium limited to the specific objective that is identified. It does 
so using a utilitarian logic, but does not reach the level of a general welfare calculus.   
In other words, systems analytic approaches are agnostic as to the preferable 
method or technique of punishment ex ante. But they are not agnostic to the type of good, 
the specific utility, that they pursue. They are not reducible to a general welfare function. 
In this sense, they target a particular policy space. And they can lead to utilitarian 
methods of deterrence, to behavioral instruments of incapacitation, or to rehabilitation. 
All that matters is that the methods chosen and the outcome—the highest ranked of “The 
Promising ALTERNATIVES”—are implemented.  
 
III. THE INFLUENCE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ON CRIMINAL LAW 
 AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
The influence of systems analysis in the field of law, writ large, is a complicated 
matter that would require lengthy treatment and would lead us astray from the focus of 
this article—namely, criminal law and criminal procedure. At the broadest level, the idea 
that the field of law could be usefully understood through the lens of a “legal system” 
percolated through Anglo-American legal thought for centuries.56 The use of biological 
systems metaphors was prominent in the nineteenth century on the Continent.57 And in 
56 See, e.g., Lord Chief Justice Wilmot’s declaration, in The King against Almon (1765), to the effect that 
“we must take the whole [legal] system [of justice] together, and consider all the several parts as supporting 
one another, and as acting in combination together, to attain the only end and object of all laws, the safety 
and security of the people.” Sir John Eardley Wilmot, Notes of Opinions and Judgements Delivered in 
Different Courts [1757-1770] (London: Luke Hansard, 1802), pp. 258-259. Of course, the simple metaphor 
of a “system” to describe natural and social phenomena went as far back as Plato, who used a biological 
system metaphor in describing his utopic vision in The Republic; Leibniz also incorporated a system 
metaphor in his metaphysics in the Monadology. 
57 According to Rottleuthner, the modern use of the system metaphor in legal thought should be traced to 
biological metaphors used by nineteenth century legal historians and theorists such as Savigny, Jhering, 
Van Krieken, and Otto Gierke (though Rottleuthner is careful to note that he has included these thinkers as 
representatives of a trend, not the originators of the metaphor). Savigny, for instance, argued that law 




                                                          
the twentieth century, the metaphor of systems continued to play an important role in 
legal thought, as reflected in the writings of Niklas Luhmann and the emergence of 
autopoesis theory,58 which drew in large part on Parsonian systems analysis.59  
Rottleuthner 1987, 103). Jhering spoke of “the legal institutions as ‘the skeleton of the law’ (1852: 36), or 
[referred to] the heart, blood, arteries or pulse of the legal organism (1853: 44)” (Rottleuthner 1987, 103). 
(Rottleuthner notes that van Krieken, in 1873, traced the origin of the metaphor in its current usage to 
Schelling and Fichte).  
58 Note: explore further the relationship and decide how much to discuss more recent literature on the 
notion of the legal system as an “autopoietic” system, much of which is focused on explaining the 
“unity”—or partly “closed” character—of legal systems, and the survival of that “closedness.” Niklas 
Luhmann is a central theorist of this view, and so is Gunther Teubner. See also George Fletcher, Paradoxes 
in Legal Thought, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1263 (1985). The autopoietic metaphor seems to differ somewhat 
from earlier metaphors. Rottleuthner suggests that part of the difference lies in the explicitly unitary 
metaphor of autopoiesis (in which the legal system is conceptualized as a single, unitary object that is its 
own causal mechanism) in contrast to older metaphors, exemplified by Kant’s notion of “organized being,” 
that use a relation between part/whole as a causal mechanism (the Kantian perspective, Rottleuthner argues, 
is somewhat closer to the metaphor’s usage by 19th century historians than contemporary autopoiesis). 
According to Teubner, theories of the autopoietic legal system maintain that “circularity is not a flaw in 
legal thinking which ought to be avoided (Fletcher, 1985: 1263), but rather that the reality of law consists 
of a multitude of circular processes….The whole legal system is seen as a dynamic cyclical reproduction of 
legal elements embedded in hypercyclical relations of legal structures and processes (Teubner, 1987a). 
Law, like other autopoietic systems, is nothing but an ‘endless dance of internal correlations in a closed 
network of interacting elements’ (Maturana, 1982: 28).” (Teubner 1987, pp. 1-2). Legal autopoiesis is not 
simply created and perpetuated through a system of norms, nor actors and organizations, but through “legal 
acts,” defined as “those communicative events that change legal structures” (Teubner 1987, p. 4). As 
Luhmann notes, “This [dialogue] means that the self-reproduction of law takes the form of change of law, 
of the transference of the quality of normative validity to partially new expectations” (Luhmann 1987, p. 
17). The dialogue between norm and action is connected to a further relationship between what Luhmann 
calls the “closed” and “open” aspects of the legal system. The legal system is ‘normatively’ closed, but 
‘cognitively’ open. Thus the legal system Luhmann describes is both open and closed; it is in constant flux 
between its norms and the (only partially successful) application of those norms to everyday behavior. 
59 Here too:  need to explore and figure out how much to say about Parsons and its relationship to technical 
systems analysis. Develop further. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952) 
and Essays in Sociological Thinking (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954) (applying structural-functionalist social 
systems analysis to theoretical and practical problems); see also Parsons and Edward Shils, “Values, 
Motives, and Systems of Action,” in Toward a General Theory of Action (New York : Harper & Row, 
1951); David Lockwood, “Some Remarks on ‘The Social System’,” The British Journal of Sociology (7) 
no. 2, 1956: pp. 134-146; Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1949). Note that in his 
Essays (1954), starting on page 228, Parsons provides a concise explanation of structural-functionalism: (a) 
social structures contain “frame[s] of reference”—the way actors are situated in a social environment; (b) a 
second level of analysis is the relationship between individual and society: “social structure is a system of 
patterned relationships of actors in their capacity as playing roles relative to one another. Role is the 
concept which links the subsystem of the actor as a “psychological” behaving entity to the 
distinctively social structure” (1954, 230); (c) patterns of roles are also patterns of expectations compelling 
actors into these roles, and this system of “patterned expectations” forms for Parsons the basis of his theory 
of “institutions”; (d) institutions necessitate two further aspects: stratification and control of deviance (the 
latter is a necessity insofar as (i) “spontaneous response to unorganized controls cannot be relied upon” and 
(ii) “roles and legitimate authority” must be maintained in the interest of the system’s stability (1954, 232); 
and (e) while individual psychology is important for structural-functionalist analyses, it is primarily of 




                                                                                                                                                                             
In the specific legal field of criminal law and criminal procedure, however, 
systems analysis would have a distinct influence because of its direct link to the “criminal 
justice system.” Just as systems analysis began to crystalize the notion of a “criminal 
justice system,” a distinct style of judicial decision-making and legal reasoning based on 
a systems analytic approach would emerge and begin to encroach upon an earlier way of 
thinking about punishment as a question of sovereign right. 
Here too, one could trace a genealogy that would link particular individuals and 
institutions. The former dean at Harvard Law School, James Vorenberg, who was a 
formidable figure in criminal law and procedure, worked closely with Alfred 
Blumstein—respectively, as Executive Director and as Director of Science and 
Technology of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice—to introduce systems analysis into criminal law reform.60 The 
1967 President’s Commission conducted a broad-ranging analysis of the state of the 
American criminal justice system,61 and its final report, “The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society,” represented an early model of the application of OR to criminal justice. 
One of the Commission report’s main accomplishments was precisely to establish “a 
‘systems point of view’ as a basic frame of reference, and a better understanding of the 
‘hydraulic’ nature of that system.”62  
As Charles F. Wellford suggests, Vorenberg undoubtedly was a large influence on 
the Commission’s decision to implement systems analysis, as was “the decision of the 
Attorney General and Secretary of Defense to allow the Institute for Defense Analysis, 
and in particular Alfred Blumstein, to be a part of the President’s Commission.”63 Also 
important was Harvard Professor Lloyd Ohlin, who had applied systems thought to the 
American Bar Foundation criminal justice surveys of the 1950s and to much of his work 
on juvenile justice, prediction, and corrections.64  
Thus the structural-functionalist does not seek to analyze individual goals, but broad patterns of goals of 
multiple individuals.  
60 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice, 1967. At the time of his appointment to the Commission as Executive Director, 
James Vorenberg was also the Director of the National Crime Commission. 
61 My dear colleague Norval Morris described it as “the greatest and most effective inquiry into the 
problems of the criminal justice system that this country has seen.” See “Random Reflections on ‘The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,’” Law & Society Review 2 (2), 1968: p. 282.  
62 Francis X. Hartmann, quoted in “The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: Looking Back Looking 
Forward,” Roundtable on Historical Perspectives, June 19-21, Washington D.C., 1997. As Charles 
Wellford notes, the 1931 Wickersham Commission’s Report on Prosecution, and later Frank Remington’s 
work on the American Bar Foundation surveys of the 1950s, also used a general systems metaphor in their 
general approach. See Charles F. Wellford, “Changing Nature of Criminal Justice System Responses and 
Its Professions,” 1997 Roundtable, p. 65-66. 
63 Charles F. Wellford, “Changing Nature of Criminal Justice System Responses and Its Professions,” 1997 
Roundtable, p. 67. 
64 Ibid., p. 59.  For illustrations of Ohlin’s use of systems analytic approaches, see, ,e.g., Lloyd E. Ohlin and 
Frank J. Remington, “Sentencing Structure: Its Effects upon Systems for the Administrators of Criminal 




                                                                                                                                                                             
In large part, the systems approach was introduced in the 1967 President’s 
Commission as an alternative to experimentation.65 As Wellford documents, “Vorenberg, 
Ohlin, Blumstein, and others emphasized the role of [systems] research” because 
“experimentation is frequently impossible” in the criminal justice arena. Wellford 
continues:  
“So the creation of a model of the system, one that could be manipulated to 
determine effects, would be a critical first step in understanding how 
improvements could be achieved. The flow chart was a first step in identifying the 
components of the system which could be manipulated to determine their effect 
on the remainder of the system. From this goal of improvement, and in 
recognition of the difficulty of the experimentation, the Commission moved to 
introduce not only a concept of criminal justice, but a methodology of system 
analysis including mathematical modeling as a way to identify and evaluate 
effective changes.”66 
The 1967 President’s Commission is a landmark for locating criminal justice 
within a “system” and for making recommendations based on the functions and 
objectives of the system. Systems analysis features prominently in the law reform project 
in two central respects: first, systems analysis is the method by which the criminal justice 
system, as a “system,” is analyzed and upon which the recommendations are based. The 
Commission outlines, using as a visual aid complex flow-charts that recall early RAND 
reports, the entirety of the criminal justice system, the modus operandi of its individual 
subparts, the relative success of each part’s performance, its personnel and resource 
allocation, and recommendations for how institutional practices, resources and personnel 
might be altered to increase success. Second, as part of these recommendations, the 
Commission calls for the future implementation of systems analysis at the local level—
the level of the subpart—in order to assess future functional needs. Vorenberg, 
Blumstein, Ohlin, and their colleagues used systems analysis in order to diagnose 
systemic problems of the criminal justice system, and subsequently recommended that 
more such analysis be applied in order to continue the practice of diagnosis and the 
specific kinds of prescription it tends to generate.  
Dean Vorenberg also headed up, with his colleague Paul Bator, a distinguished 
study group of the American Law Institute on criminal justice.67 That commission was 
the first survey of its kind in the United States, and it sought to map out the various levels 
Correctional Change,” The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, 45 (4), 1954: p. 
402; Lloyd Ohlin, “Validation and Control of Parole Prediction,” The Midwest Sociologist 12 (1), 1949: p. 
9; Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs 
(Free Press, 1966).  
65 Note: May want to explore here relation of systems analysis to Charles Sabel and William Simon on 
experimentalist governance.  
66 Wellford, “Changing Nature of Criminal Justice System Responses and Its Professions,” 1997, p. 67. 
67 William Glaberson, “James Vorenberg, Watergate Prosecutor’s Right-Hand Man, Dies at 72,” The New 




                                                                                                                                                                             
of the American criminal justice system (and “non-system,” as its authors sometimes 
termed it).68  
There were, of course, others with OR backgrounds. Associate Justice John M. 
Harlan II, who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1955 and would influence much of 
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, had “headed up the Eighth Air 
Force Operations Analysis Section (OAS)” during World War II as part of an effort to 
introduce OR into U.S. Air Force tactics.69 Nicholas Katzenbach, who served as Attorney 
General during President Lyndon Johnson’s administration, headed the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the Kennedy administration, and taught law at Yale and then Chicago,70 also 
had an OR background and would serve as chair of the report of the 1967 President’s 
Commission.71  
Although it would be possible to dig deeper into these personal and institutional 
genealogies, the influence of systems analysis on criminal law and procedure was 
probably more indirect: Systems analysis was in the air in the 1960s and it was having a 
direct influence on criminology and the study of the “criminal justice system.” At exactly 
the same time, there began to be a distinct style of judicial decision-making that rested on 
a systems analytic approach. This style of reasoning would take two distinct forms. 
A. The Internal Approach: Models of the Criminal Justice System 
In one form, the judicial decision-maker or legal scholar considers criminal law 
and procedure adjudication to be part of the “criminal justice system” and attempts to 
maximize the objectives of the system.  
 
 
68 Michael D. Maltz, “From Poisson to the Present: Applying Operations Research to Problems of Crime 
and Justice,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 12 (1) 1996: pp. 11-12. 
69 Joseph F. McCloskey, “U.S. Operations Research in World War II,” Operations Research, Vol. 35, No. 6 
(Nov. - Dec., 1987), pp. 910-925. And there were many others, of course. For instance, W. Barton Leach, 
who taught at Harvard Law School from 1929-1960 and at the Harvard Graduate School of Public 
Administration from 1954-1969, was involved with Operations Research during the Second World War, 
when he directed the Operations Analysis Division of the Army Air Force. See Charles R Schrader, History 
of Operations Research in the US Army, Vol. I, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
the Army for Operations Research, 2006). Leslie H. Arps, who served with Justice Harlan in the Army Air 
Force Operations Analysis Section and eventually replaced him, worked from 1951 to 1953 as “assistant 
chief counsel to the New York State Crime Commission during its investigation of mob control of the 
waterfront.” Dennis Hevesi, “Leslie H. Arps Dies; Founding Member of Major Law Firm,” The New York 
Times, 16 July 1987. 
70 Douglas Martin, “Nicholas Katzenbach, 90, Dies; Policy Maker at ‘60s Turning Points,” The New York 
Times, 9 May 2012.  
71 Michael D. Maltz, “From Poisson to the Present: Applying Operations Research to Problems of Crime 




                                                          
a. Herbert Packer’s “Models” of the Criminal Process 
Herbert Packer would lead the way in identifying this style of reasoning by 
describing, in one of the most celebrated (at the time and still today, for many) theoretical 
interventions, two dominant “models” of constitutional criminal procedure. First 
presented in his article “Two Models of the Criminal Process,”72 published in 1964, and 
then further developed in his book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,73 published in 
1968, Packer described two competing models of judicial reasoning in criminal law and 
procedure: a crime control model, oriented toward the goal of reducing crime, and a due 
process model, oriented toward the goal of protecting individual rights.  
Although Packer did not explicitly use the term “systems analysis,” the models 
that he identified were unquestionably systems analytic. In his own language and analysis 
of the crime-control model, for instance, Packer would expressly deploy systems 
discourse. He wrote, for instance, that “By ‘efficiency’ we mean the system’s capacity to 
apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose 
offenses become known.”74 Modeling itself, from Packer’s perspective, was a form of 
systems thought. As he wrote: 
We need to detach ourselves from the welter of more or less connected details that 
make up an accurate description of the myriad ways in which the criminal process 
does operate or may be likely to operate in midtwentieth-century America so that 
we can begin to appraise the system as a whole in terms of its capacity to deal 
with the variety of substantive missions we confide to it.75 
In this sense, Packer’s Limits of the Criminal Sanction proceeds from a systems 
analytic framework. The project starts by identifying a social problem. In fact, the very 
first paragraph of the book opens with an articulation, clarification, and identification of 
the “social problem” that the book addresses: “the problem of trying to control anti-social 
behavior by imposing punishment on people found guilty of violating rules of conduct 
called criminal statutes.”76 With that social problem in mind, Packer then turns to a form 
of modeling. Simple modeling, no equations, but modeling nonetheless. The idea is to 
“begin to see how the system as a whole might be able to deal with the variety of 
missions we confide to it” and, for this, the approach he takes is “to abstract from reality, 
to build a model.”77 Packer in fact builds two models, which represent, he suggests, the 
two poles or extreme points of the “two value systems that compete for priority in the 
72 Packer, Herbert, “Two Models of the Criminal Process,” 113 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1, 
1964. 
73 Packer, Herbert, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968. 
74 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 158 (emphasis added). 
75 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 152 (emphasis added). 
76 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 3.  




                                                          
operation of the criminal process.”78 Packer presents his models as “an attempt to give 
operational content to a complex of values underlying the criminal law.”79 
The crime control model, Packer explains, “is based on the proposition that the 
repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by 
the criminal process.”80 In other words, the system objective is crime reduction. This 
clearly represents a systems analysis of criminal law and procedure that has as its 
objective crime reduction. The actors in the models include “lawmakers, judges, police, 
prosecutors, defense lawyers.”81 And the model rests on an efficiency analysis: “the 
Crime Control Model requires that primary attention be paid to the efficiency with which 
the criminal process operates to screen suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate 
dispositions of persons convicted of crime.”82 The criterion of efficiency has to do with 
the ability of the process to catch and convict large numbers of offenders.  
For this, Packer notes, “There must then be a premium on speed and finality. 
Speed, in turn, depends on informality and on uniformity; finality depends on minimizing 
the occasions for challenge.”83 Packer explains: 
The image that comes to mind is an assembly-line conveyor belt down which 
moves an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers 
who stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the same 
small but essential operation that brings it one step closer to being a finished 
product, or, to exchange the metaphor for the reality, a closed file.84 
The applications of the crime control model that Packer discusses make clear that 
this is systems analysis. So, for instance, in discussing the question of police misconduct 
attendant to arrests, Packer rehearses the systems analytic approach. Packer collects and 
evaluates the most promising alternatives and essentially ranks them ordinally: the “most 
appropriate” policy ends up being discipline of the offending officer; the second 
alternative is civil remedies against the police officer; and the bottom (in this case, 
unacceptable) alternative is suppression of the evidence or dismissal of the case.85 Packer 
applies the same kind of analysis, under the crime control model, to issues ranging from 
investigatory stops under the Terry stop-and-frisk rule86; the length of detention and 
interrogation prior to consulting an attorney or notifying family87; how coercive 
78 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 153.  
79 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 154.  
80 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 158. 
81 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 154.  
82 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 158. 
83 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 159.  
84 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 159. 
85 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 178.  
86 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 182-183. 




                                                          
interrogations may be88; the Miranda rule89; electronic surveillance90; and all the steps 
between charging decisions and pre-trial detention to the determination of guilt, to 
appeals and post-conviction review.  
By contrast to this first model, the due process model that Packer develops is 
oriented toward a cluster of liberal legal objectives. “Its ideology,” Packer tells us, “is 
composed of a complex of ideas, some of them based on judgments about the efficacy of 
crime control devices, others having to do with quite different considerations.”91 Some of 
these quite different considerations include the importance of factual accuracy, the value 
of equality (even for indigent defendants), and a certain skepticism regarding the morality 
and the utility of punishment. The result is a very different model: “The Due Process 
Model resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input to quality 
control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output.”92    
Whether the due process model is, strictly speaking, a “model” by systems 
analysis standards is perhaps debatable, in large part because the objectives are so much 
less quantifiable. Even Packer draws an important distinction between the positive or 
what he calls “affirmative” nature of the crime control model and the “negative model” of 
due process.93 This distinction between positive and negative is important because 
systems analysis is, by definition, oriented to a positive objective. We could imagine that 
we have here, sensu stricto, one systems analysis approach (which explains why Packer 
also views the crime-control model as ultimately resting on administrative and legislative 
authority) versus a more legalistic approach that is based on judicial oversight (and here, 
Packer also places this second model under the authority of judicial power).94  
But this is all quibbling at the edges. The crime control model is squarely systems 
analytic, and ultimately Packer himself adopts a crime-control systems analytic view—or 
what he calls an “Integrated Theory of Criminal Punishment” that includes two maxims, 
the first of which is that “It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment that 
it is designed to prevent the commission of offenses.”95 Packer also includes a 
blameworthiness condition in order to prevent the punishment of innocent people or 
88 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 189.  
89 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 193.  
90 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 194-196.  
91 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 163.  
92 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 165.  
93 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 173.  
94 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 173. Incidentally, Packer interprets the Supreme Court decisions (this being 
1968) as instruments, predominantly, of the due process model, which he refers to as a more court-centric 
approach—in contrast to the crime control model which he views as more administrative and policy 
oriented. See Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 239. 




                                                          
unjust punishment96; the notion of culpability is, in his words, a “limiting principle, not a 
justification for action.”97  
As Packer states, the goal should be crime reduction: he adopts as his “rationale” 
for the criminal sanction—i.e., as his objective and guiding principle—“one that pursues 
the central goal of prevention of socially undesirable behavior, as limited by restrictions 
of culpability.”98 In the third portion of the book, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 
which consists of material that was not included in the original article on “Two Models of 
the Criminal Process,” Packer emphasizes that: 
The function of the criminal sanction is to help prevent or reduce socially 
undesirable conduct through the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and 
punishment of offenders. This is the only function that its rationale permits and 
this is the only function with which its processes are adequately equipped to 
deal.99 
This is, in the end, a systems analytic approach.100 And it was received as such. 
Packer’s admirers and detractors recognized the systematic and analytic dimensions of 
his intervention.101 And note, of course, that the timing is perfect: Packer develops his 
models at the height of systems analytic thinking, in the mid-1960s, when McNamara 
was using PPBS at the Pentagon and President Johnson was imposing the method on the 
full federal government. 
96 So his second limiting condition is as follows: “It is a necessary but not sufficient condition of 
punishment that the person on whom it is imposed is found to have committed an offense under 
circumstances that permit his conduct to be characterized as blameworthy.” Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 62. It 
will entail the maxim that “No one may be subjected to criminal punishment except for conduct.” Packer, 
Limits, 1968, p. 73. 
97 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 66.  
98 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 71.  
99 Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 293. 
100 In the third part of his book, Packer addressed the proper scope of criminal law in the context of the 
regulation of vice, and ultimately weighed in favor of limiting the criminal sanction as a way to render the 
criminal process more just and efficient. Resting on Sir Robert Peel’s insight that policing reforms require 
first paying attention to the proper scope of the criminal law, see Packer, Limits, 1968, p. 365-366, Packer 
essentially recommended to “the rational legislator” to rethink and carefully refine the scope and extent of 
the criminal sanction, believing that the criminalization of moral offenses and other “conduct whose 
potentiality for harm is trivial or nonexistent” did most of the harm to the system. Packer, 1968, Limits, p. 
246. In this, one can see an affinity with some of William Stuntz’s recommendations in The Collapse of 
American Criminal Justice (Harvard 2011). The goal for the rational legislator would be to rethink the 
scope of the criminal law “with a view to deciding which uses are relatively indispensable and which might 
with safety (and perhaps even with some net gain to the public welfare) be restricted or given up.” Packer, 
Limits, 1968, p. 246.  
101 As John Griffiths would write, for instance, “Packer’s article is widely regarded as the most important 
recent contribution to systematic thought about criminal procedure…. Packer sets out to construct an 
analytic structure which comprehends ‘the spectrum of choices that is at least in theory open in fixing the 
shape of the criminal process.’” Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” 79 The Yale Law Journal 3, 




                                                          
 The same would be true for the leading critic of Packer’s models, John Griffiths, 
who published in the Yale Law Journal in 1970 an article entitled “Ideology in Criminal 
Procedure or A Third ‘Model’ of the Criminal Process.”102 Griffiths’ argument was that 
Packer’s two models were actually both part of a single “battle model” of criminal 
procedure, and he proposed, for argument’s sake, a different model of the criminal 
process, what he called the “Family Model.” But even Griffiths’s alternative model can 
be interpreted through systems analytics:  namely, as pursuing a family-oriented objective 
within a systems theory.  
Griffiths argued that Packer’s Due Process Model rested on the same assumptions 
about the function of the criminal law system. Packer’s description of the Due Process 
Model as undermining the efficiency of the process—of being simply inefficient—
reflects the unidimensionality of the analysis, Griffiths argued: due process protections 
“can only be deemed simply ‘inefficient’ if the values they serve are not included among 
the substantive goals of the criminal process.”103 As a result, Griffiths argues, Packer’s 
two models were nothing more than two versions of a common “Battle Model”: 
In the service of this fundamental dogma, Packer consistently portrays the 
criminal process as a struggle—a stylized war—between two contending forces 
whose interests are implacably hostile: the Individual (particularly, the accused 
individual) and the State. His two Models are nothing more than alternative 
derivations from that conception of profound and irreconcilable disharmony of 
interest. Since the metaphor of battle roughly suits this silent premise about the 
nature of the relationship of state and individual reflected in the criminal process, 
I shall use it to characterize Packer’s position: the Battle Model of the criminal 
process.104 
 Griffiths developed, in his article, an alternative model to the Battle Model, 
which he called the Family Model—not one, he writes, that he necessarily espoused, but 
that he offered by way of illustration. That family model assumed, as its premise, that the 
interests of the various parties are reconcilable and it took, as its concern, “what, 
speaking broadly, is ‘good for’ a defendant caught up in the criminal process.”105 The 
central function of the criminal process, from this perspective, is to improve the overall 
health of the social unit that is represented by the family. As Griffiths wrote, “it is central 
to the Family Model that the function of the process involves far more than suppressing 
certain offenses.”106 Instead, along this dimension, the educational function would be one 
of the more important: “One particularly important substantive function with reference to 
102 Griffiths, John, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third ‘Model’ of the Criminal Process,” Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 79(3), pp. 359-417 (January 1970).  
103 Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” 1970, p. 366. 
104 Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” 1970, p. 367. 
105 Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” 1970, p. 387. 




                                                          
which any institution can be designed is its educational impact upon those exposed to 
it.”107  
It would be possible to think of Griffiths’s model along systems analytic terms: 
the objective would be the health of the social unit, the family, and various different 
forms of punishment and process could be evaluated with that criterion in mind. Griffiths 
had, however, a particular view about the use of the term “model” that I do not agree 
with. Griffiths argued that the term “model” merely stood for a “perspective” or an 
“interpretation” of the criminal process.108 Griffiths rejected the idea that these are, really, 
models, and argued that Packer himself could not believe “that writ large either would be 
a functioning system of criminal procedure.”109 I think that is entirely wrong, and that we 
are in fact dealing—surely with the Crime Control Model, possibly with the Due Process 
Model, and, ironically, with Griffiths’s Family Model—with models that should be 
understood as systems analytic methods.110   
b. Supreme Court Adjudication 
In contrast to Packer’s stylized crime control model which utilizes a systems 
analytic method in the strict sense—comparing alternatives, ranking them, and endorsing 
the most efficient mechanisms for crime control—judicial decision-making that adopts 
systems analytics tends to do so more informally. The act of adjudication—especially the 
way in which issues make their way to the courts and the types of decisions that courts 
are generally asked to perform (i.e. whether a promising alternative is constitutional or 
not)—puts a certain limit on a judge’s ability to engage in full-blown systems analysis.  
As a result, judges who embrace a systems analytic approach tend to focus on the 
later stages of system analysis: they will articulate, first, one or more overarching 
objectives for the criminal justice system—such as, for instance, crime control, security 
management, or the proper and efficient functioning of the criminal justice system—but 
then fast forward to the final columns of the analysis and declare that the particular legal 
practice at issue is the most efficient or a fully efficient and proper way to satisfy the 
system’s objective. The analysis is somewhat truncated. It rarely engages in rigorous 
empirical analysis, data collection, modeling, or quantitative analysis. But it functions in 
the same way, especially at the tail end, and adopts the language and style of system 
analysis.  
It is precisely the systems analytic approach that affords this form of judicial 
decision-making its neutrality and objectivity. Just as Schlesinger would claim that 
systems analysis is objective and eliminates moral or normative considerations, judicial 
107 Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” 1970, p. 389.   
108 Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” p. 362 n. 14.  
109 Griffiths, “Ideology in Criminal Procedure,” p. 362 n. 14. 
110 There is, though, another reading of Griffiths that is perhaps more in line with my argument here, 
namely that the conventional systems analytic approach, focused on crime reduction, in its simplicity 




                                                          
reasoning that rests on this approach also claims objectivity and purports to avoid 
subjective normative judgments. On this view, a particular practice—such as, for 
instance, jury discretion or stop-and-frisk policies—is viewed as either efficient and 
necessary to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system or not, but in either 
case the determination is presented as an objective fact about the practice that does not 
require normative or moral evaluation. The needs of the system do not lend themselves to 
subjective assessments or evaluation: the systems analytic approach in adjudication is 
about reality, a proponent might say, not about morality.  
Several of the landmark Warren Court opinions in criminal procedure reflect this 
internal systems analytic approach. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona111 is an 
interesting illustration. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court integrates a systems 
analysis, not as to the narrow legal question at issue—namely, whether the Fifth 
Amendment applies to custodial interrogation at the police precinct—but as to the 
remedy, once the legal issue has been resolved. In other words, once Chief Justice 
Warren has made the strictly legal decision at the heart of Miranda—namely, once he 
decides to extend the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination from the 
courtroom into the police custodial setting112—he then turns, effectively, to systems 
analytic reasoning to determine the remedy. Though he does not, in fact, collect all 
possible “promising alternatives,” he does evaluate and endorse, on effectiveness 
grounds, the specific framework of Miranda warnings—and then encourages Congress to 
do the rest: 
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the 
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their 
creative rule-making capacities... We encourage Congress and the States to 
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the 
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal 
laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as 
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a 
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be 
observed.113  
Right here, Chief Justice Warren embeds a partial systems analysis within his 
remedial discussion. His discussion sounds in systems analysis: it sets out a clear 
objective, and then evaluates different options, keeping the functionality of the system at 
the heart of the discussion: 
Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and 
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated 
warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself 
111 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
112 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (1966) 




                                                          
suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A 
mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that 
end….  
 Chief Justice Warren then evaluates different promising alternatives as if he is 
putting them through a model, trying to decipher their individual attributes, in order to 
compare and rank them:  
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant 
subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the 
assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer 
present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if 
coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The 
presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully 
accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the 
prosecution at trial.114  
Notice the systems functionality discourse: Warren’s analysis is aimed at ensuring 
that the system functions properly and effectively—and promises to leave it in place 
unless and until Congress would provide for, essentially, an equal or higher ranking 
“alternative.” In the process, Warren is unquestionably activist in setting out the 
necessary pre-interrogation procedures, going so far as to create, out of whole cloth, a 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
(and a right to the appointment of Fifth Amendment counsel if indigent). 
The subsequent Dickerson litigation, several decades later, would turn precisely 
on whether Congress’s response in 1968—18 U.S.C. § 3501—was more effective than 
the Miranda warnings.115 This is, essentially, a systems analysis type of question: to 
resolve it, we need to load both the Miranda warnings and the 18 U.S.C. § 3501 
procedures into Quade’s model and see whether the latter exceed the level of protection 
afforded by the former. Of this, Warren was clear: “unless other fully effective means are 
adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the 
right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required.”116 
Note that the systems analytic material, in the Miranda decision, does not address 
the legal issue at hand—namely the extension of the Fifth Amendment right to police 
custody—a legal question that is resolved through a far more extensive, capacious, and 
wide-ranging discussion of policing and democracy in the modern era, and that ranges 
from Lord Devlin’s writings and English procedure since 1912, to India, Ceylon and 
114 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-470 (1966) 
115 See discussion of Dickerson and empirical evidence on Miranda in Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. 
Harcourt, “Foreword to the Supreme Court Review:  Transparent Adjudication and Social Science 
Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,” 90 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 733 - 798 
(2000). 




                                                          
Scotland, to democratic theory. But it is present at the remedies stage. In that sense, it 
could possibly be thought of more in line with operations research than with systems 
analysis.  
It is interesting to note that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Miranda also has a systems 
analytic ring to it. (Recall that Harlan had led the Eighth Air Force Operations Analysis 
Section during World War II). Harlan focuses on a detailed comparison of the different 
alternatives along policy grounds: “Viewed as a choice based on pure policy, these new 
rules prove to be a highly debatable, if not one-sided, appraisal of the competing 
interests, imposed over widespread objection, at the very time when judicial restraint is 
most called for by the circumstances.”117 Harlan’s Due Process jurisprudence is, in fact, 
guided by a systemic approach: as he writes, the Due Process Clause cases “show that 
there exists a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial 
manner” and they reveal “the baseline from which the Court now departs and so serve to 
measure the actual as opposed to the professed distance it travels.”118 Harlan challenges 
the majority in Miranda not only on legal, but on policy grounds, in what sounds very 
much like systems discourse.119 
As Daniel Richman suggests, the Warren Court’s incorporation doctrine and 
expanded habeas corpus review, in and of itself, practically demanded a systems analytic 
approach: by placing itself over an entirely decentralized criminal justice universe—one 
that extended into the deepest reaches of local and municipal practices, such as local 
bailbondsmen and sheriffs—the Court practically had to use systems functionality 
discourse as a necessary heuristic device. One could argue that it was practically 
inevitable that the Court would think in systems terms once it had to wrap its hands 
around such a localized criminal justice world.   
More recent canonical Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law and procedure 
area reveal perhaps even more systems analytic reasoning on the core constitutional 
issues at stake. Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is a 
good illustration.120 Justice Powell adopts a systems perspective when he analyzes the 
role of discretion (prosecutorial, judicial, jury, and other) in the functioning of the 
criminal justice system—as a counterweight to the legal challenge involving racial 
discrimination. The opinion is written in a way that includes the judiciary, the jury, the 
attorneys, etc., as part of the system, and in this sense, represents an instance of the 
117 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (1966) (HARLAN, J., dissenting) 
118 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 506 (1966) (HARLAN, J., dissenting) 
119 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (1966) (HARLAN, J., dissenting) (“What the Court largely ignores is that 
its rules impair, if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of law enforcement that 
has long and quite reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it. There can be little doubt that the 
Court’s new code would markedly decrease the number of confessions… [T]o suggest or provide counsel 
for the suspect simply invites the end of the interrogation…. How much harm this decision will inflict on 
law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with accuracy”).  




                                                          
internal style of systems analytic decision-making. For Justice Powell, the legal claim 
itself is a challenge addressed to the very functioning of the criminal justice system:  
McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system. 
“[O]ne of society’s most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens 
and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through criminal 
laws against murder.” Gregg v. Georgia (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring). 
Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments. 
Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand 
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been 
abused.121  
Notice how the system’s needs become necessities and how the functioning of the 
criminal justice system naturally heightens the legal burden imposed on the petitioner 
McCleskey. The result is that the system’s needs are privileged. In rejecting McCleskey’s 
challenge, Powell emphasizes that “McCleskey’s argument that the Constitution 
condemns the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital sentencing 
system is antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal justice 
system.”122  
The analysis is framed in terms of system requirements and system functionality, 
and so, Powell concludes: “Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal 
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light 
of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value 
of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to 
criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a 
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing 
process.”123 From this particular systems analytic perspective, the risk of harm associated 
with racial prejudice does not undermine the value of discretion to the overall system: 
“Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice 
system,”124 Powell observes. Powell’s opinion in McCleskey is really an idealtype of a 
decision that takes a systems analytic approach to the criminal justice system. Ultimately, 
the question ends up revolving centrally around the system’s need for discretion.  
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the principle of finality in the habeas 
corpus context is another good example. The argument for foreclosing consideration of 
certain issues past a certain point in time (for instance, once the petitioner has entered 
collateral review) rests predominantly on the argument that there are certain things the 
criminal justice system needs in order to function properly—and one of those is finality. 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Teague v. Lane, for instance, can serve as an 
121 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 (1987). 
122 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311 (1987) (emphasis added). 
123 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 (1987).  




                                                          
illustration.125 The question there was whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to the 
benefit of a new legal rule (in that case, whether the Sixth Amendment fair cross section 
requirement would apply to a petit jury) if the rule is announced after the petitioner has 
exhausted his direct appeals and while the petitioner is in collateral review. Justice 
O’Connor, for the Court, adopted Justice Harlan’s retroactivity standard, which barred 
the retroactive effect of new rules to cases pending in collateral review (with two narrow 
exceptions).  
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning tracks perfectly the systems analytic approach. 
Justice O’Connor begins as follows: 
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction 
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to 
the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is 
deprived of much of its deterrent effect.126 
Justice O’Connor then reviews the cost-effectiveness of the alternative policy and finds 
that it is prohibitive: 
The “costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of 
constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally far outweigh the benefits of this 
application.” Stumes (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). In many ways the 
application of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than 
the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, cf. Younger v. Harris, for it continually 
forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose 
trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. … We find 
these criticisms to be persuasive, and we now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of 
retroactivity for cases on collateral review.127 
This systems analytic approach, interestingly, has also been used in recent 
scholarship to defend the principle of finality in cases of purported actual innocence. 
William Baude, for instance, argues that if “courts must allow every prisoner to 
perpetually pursue claims of innocence, it might push an already overburdened judicial 
system to the brink.”128 Such a right to not be executed if innocent would render the 
criminal justice system dysfunctional. Perfect accuracy is not the systems objective, 
Baude emphasizes: “perfect accuracy is not the goal of the criminal justice system.”129 
Notice how the neutral objectives of the system drive the analysis.130   
125 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
126 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 309 (1989).  
127 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 310 (1989).  
128 William Baude, “Last Chance on Death Row,” Wilson Quarterly, Autumn 2010, p. 21.  
129 William, 2010, p. 20-21.  
130 Compare and discuss in relation to the extensive investigatory work in James S. Liebman et al., “Los 




                                                          
In the death penalty case that I am litigating now, Doyle Lee Hamm v. Richard 
Allen, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (Eleventh Circuit, No. 
13-14376-P), the central issue is whether the Eleventh Circuit can review the validity of a 
prior felony conviction from 1978 that was used as an aggravating circumstance to 
enhance Hamm’s sentence to death in 1987. As a pretty straightforward matter, the prior 
felony conviction is facially invalid: the plea hearing from 1978 is unconstitutional, on its 
face, because the circuit judge in Tennessee in 1978 did not inform Hamm of the 
constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, in clear violation of Boykin 
v. Alabama.131 This problem has slowed the case down to a crawl, and Hamm has been 
on death row for 26 years in part because of this festering sore—and yet, not a single 
judge to date has addressed the merits of the argument or read the short, 2,500-word 
transcript of the plea hearing on its merits, because of the federal system’s interest in 
finality: the case is a perfect illustration of the situation where the reviewing judges (at 
the state and federal, trial and appellate levels) have taken a systems analytic approach 
focused on the purported integrity or functionality of the system itself in order to avoid 
consideration of the claims on the merits. What the systems analytic approach obviates is 
a full consideration of the other values regarding the criminal sanction that circulate in 
society.132  
 B.   The External Approach: Deference to the Criminal Justice System 
In another manifestation, the courts view themselves as outside the criminal 
justice system and instead resolve cases by deferring to the expertise of core actors within 
the system. A recent illustration would be Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders 
(2011) regarding the constitutionality of strip searches incident to jail detention for minor 
arrests. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority, upholding a policy of prophylactic 
strip searches, essentially defers to the system’s experts.  
131 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
132 Cases involving the practice of plea bargaining also often tend to rely on this systems analytic style of 
reasoning. A good illustration is Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Missouri v. Frye (2012), finding defense 
counsel ineffective for failing to present a defendant with a written plea offer before it expired. The 
language there is heavy on system needs: “The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the 
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain 
process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth 
Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages,” Kennedy writes. “Because ours ‘is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’ it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair 
trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process…. In today’s criminal justice system, 
therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical 
point for a defendant.” Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). Many other areas of habeas corpus 
litigation produce an internal systems analysis. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Ryan v. Gonzales 
(2013) and ruling that there is no right to competence during federal habeas proceedings, states: “Because 
federal habeas is “a ‘guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ not a 
substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal,” the types of errors redressable under § 2254(d) 
should be apparent from the record. Harrington v. Richter (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 




                                                          
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Florence opens on a particularly strong systems 
analytic tone. The first two sentences of the opinion read: “Correctional officials have a 
legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by 
reason of what new detainees may carry on their bodies. Facility personnel, other 
inmates, and the new detainee himself or herself may be in danger if these threats are 
introduced into the jail population.”133 Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the closed-nature 
of the jail system,134 and in rejecting the argument for constitutional limits on strip 
searches, Justice Kennedy writes that any such limits would vitiate the objectives of the 
system: “The laborious administration of prisons would become less effective, and likely 
less fair and evenhanded.”135 Justice Kennedy’s decision is guided by a systems analytic 
approach:  
“The difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by 
the courts…. Maintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the 
expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise 
reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”136 
Justice Kennedy marshals and quantifies the risks to the jail system, and then 
defers to the systems experts: “In addressing this type of constitutional claim courts must 
defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial 
evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of 
jail security.”137 
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Maryland v. King (2013), upholding the use of 
DNA evidence against a person charged with sexual assault where the DNA sample had 
been taken as a matter of routine booking on another arrest, provides another illustration. 
Justice Kennedy opens his legal analysis with the following systems analytics: 
the utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is already 
undisputed. Since the first use of forensic DNA analysis to catch a rapist and 
murderer in England in 1986, law enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts 
have acknowledged DNA testing’s “unparalleled ability both to exonerate the 
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly 
improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices.”138 
133 Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1513 (2012).   
134 Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 (2012). 
135 Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1521 (2012). 
136 Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 (2012). 
137 Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1513-14. Note that the policy contradicted the best practices of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, the U. S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Service, and the U.S. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs—agencies that all require reasonable suspicion before strip searching minor 
offenders. Query whether the systems analysis was thorough here…   




                                                          
Once this systems view is established, it then does a lot of work. Faced with the 
Fourth Amendment issue in the case, Justice Kennedy finds that the governmental 
interest served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act is a core function of the criminal 
justice system—namely, “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate 
way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.”139 
It is because of the system’s needs that Kennedy then upholds the DNA sampling. As he 
writes, the “context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying 
respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so 
that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial 
custody.”140 It is also interesting to note that Justice Scalia’s outraged dissent in King 
essentially dismantles the system functionality analysis of the DNA sampling for 
identification. Justice Scalia takes apart the systems reasoning of the majority decision.  
* * * 
These are examples or, better yet, idealtypes of two forms of systems analytic 
reasoning—the internal and external. They can be found alongside other styles of judicial 
decision-making. In any particular judicial opinion that relies on systems analytics, they 
are not necessarily the only reason or style of reasoning used; they may accompany other 
forms of argumentation; and they are not always decisive.  
In closing, to sharpen the idealtype, it may be useful to offer a foil, an example of 
its opposite. Here we could look to Judge Shira Scheindlin’s opinion in the New York 
City stop-and-frisk litigation for a contrasting idealtype. At the very beginning of her 
opinion in Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Scheindlin writes: 
I emphasize at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that this case is not 
about the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This 
Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its 
effectiveness as a law enforcement tool. Many police practices may be useful for 
fighting crime—preventive detention or coerced confessions, for example—but 
because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter how effective. 
“The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices 
off the table.”141 
From the outset, Judge Scheindlin sets aside any consideration of the 
effectiveness or necessity of stop-and-frisk to the criminal justice system. This is not to 
argue that Judge Scheindlin’s ultimate resolution of the constitutional questions in Floyd 
is automatically correct just because she avoids systems analytic reasoning. We would 
need a much longer discussion on the merits to decide that question. The only point here 
139 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970 (2013).  
140 Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 (2013) (emphasis added).  




                                                          
is that systems analytics are effectively off the table and the notion of a “criminal justice 
system” has been bracketed.   
 
 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
 
There are, in my opinion, problems with this systems analytic approach in 
criminal law and procedure. But to understand them best—to understand them 
technically—we have to return first to the specific, technical area of systems analysis and 
see where it went wrong.  
A. The Problem with Systems Analysis 
Systems analysis inverts the relationship between means and ends: It subsumes 
social values and goods (such as education, health care, transportation, or security) to a 
calculus that converts them into mere instrumentalities of policy decision-making. 
Instead of systems analysis serving as a tool to ensure the proper implementation of 
social ideals, systems analysis reshapes and distorts those very ideals and values—
“distorts” in the sense that it affects the balance of values in our society without openly 
engaging, debating, confronting, or negotiating the very shift in the balance of ideals that 
the method brings about. There are at least three dimensions to the problem. 
First, the systems analytic approach assumes the fungibility of policy alternatives 
regardless of the different values that they embody and reflect. As a result, the systems 
analysis approach ignores the implications of policy choice on social ideals. In this 
regard, the approach produces a radical inversion of politics—which can be illustrated 
well by Quade’s observation, earlier, that “education, antipoverty measures, police 
protection, and slum clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile 
delinquency.”142 Notice in this statement how a narrow objective—here, combating 
juvenile delinquency—ends up taking priority over forms of implementation that have 
fundamentally different values, such as an educated citizenry and a robust public sphere 
(“education”), political and economic equality or equality of opportunity (“antipoverty 
measures”), political freedom, security, and civil liberties (“police protection”), as well as 
urban politics and planning (“slum clearance”). An innocent and narrow objective 
(combating juvenile delinquency) has turned these different values into mere instrumental 
goods. It has displaced political contestation. It has imposed, under the veil of neutral, 
objective, positivistic science, a mechanism that will produce its own value outcomes.  
The trouble is, the set of alternative policies cuts across multiple social ideals and 
visions, and as a result, the policy output, if it is implemented, will necessarily affect and 
shape the society we live in, its ideals and its values. It converts political goods—an 
educated citizenry (education), equality (antipoverty measures), and security (police 




                                                          
protection)—into mere levers of public policy, and imposes under a veil of neutrality a 
new political condition. The traditional fix for this problem—namely, incorporating into 
the welfare maximizing calculus the weighting of those values (for instance, discounting 
the benefits of increased policing to reflect the loss of utility associated with decreased 
liberty interests)—essentially either waters down or, if done robustly, undercuts the 
systems analytic approach itself.  
Second, by selecting more quantifiable objectives and variables, which the 
method itself demands (for instance, juvenile delinquency rates) rather than larger social 
values (for instance, youth welfare), or even larger social ideals (such as, for instance, 
freedom or education), and by focusing exclusively on measurable outcomes, the systems 
analytic approach privileges the more quantifiable, measurable, and instrumental factors 
in the analysis. It is always going to be those variables that can be measured more easily 
(such as arrest rates or convictions or deaths) that are going to be privileged over more 
qualitative or soft variables. And the fact is, the more easily measurable, quantifiable, and 
instrumental factors tend to be associated with the harder social systems (such as the 
military or prison system), rather than education or community stability. As a result, 
systems analysis itself has a particular tilt that favors certain types of outcomes. 
Educational alternatives often will get short shrift because of the difficulty of assessing 
their long-term benefits. Poverty reduction and other “soft” variables will be more 
difficult to measure in terms of impact and outcomes. The hard edge of the systems 
analysis approach simply favors hard systems.   
Third, systems analysis takes for granted the construction of social problems and 
the boundaries of social systems, and thereby insulates the formulation of the problem 
from deeper critical investigation. The method assumes an agreed-upon problem and a 
shared understanding of its scope—in particular, of the system in question. There is 
nothing in the model to assess or compare or determine which problems society should 
address. The method thus begins with the collection of promising alternative policies. As 
a result, the approach shifts attention away from how the social problem has been chosen, 
constructed, and legitimated, and how prioritizing that particular problem in that social 
system may affect society. It effectively isolates problem-solving from problem-
production, and in the process hinders an open debate over the full consequences of 
choosing a particular package of social problems to address as a society.  
All three dimensions of the problem are illustrated well in the Liechenstein study 
from 1971, so let’s return there for a moment.143 Based on the close analysis of the 
different alternatives, the Liechenstein report found that the most efficient technique was 
police manning. Policing trumped education or recreation in terms of efficiency.144 The 
143 Liechenstein, Reducing Crime in Apartment Dwellings, 1971. 
144 The study ultimately suggested that even the most effective security measures—extensive surveillance, 
increased policing, and posting of armed guards at each building—were too expensive (p. 24), and as a 
result, did not specifically endorse any of the security measures analyzed. Ironically, the NYC RAND 




                                                          
systems analysis had value effects. And the City ultimately implemented very similar 
policy solutions, focused precisely on increased policing and manpower. After a 63-year-
old woman in a Lower East Side project was killed, Simeon Golar, chairman of the New 
York City Housing Authority, instituted a “‘100-man mobile task force’ consisting of 40 
housing policemen and the hiring of 60 new policemen.”145 There followed a $500,000 
initiative to hire armed and unarmed guards for the city’s housing projects, as well as a 
$1 million allocation for security and surveillance equipment.146 The increased police 
manning was also accompanied by stricter judicial sentencing. There was a perceived 
sense in the media and among politicians that lax judicial practices had contributed to the 
crime epidemic.147 These combined policy interventions would fuel increased 
incarceration in New York State that would contribute, starting in 1973, to what has come 
to be known today as mass incarceration.148  
The NYC RAND Institute’s systems analytic approach favored the police and 
punishment-oriented solutions that were inherently more tangible, measureable, and 
quantifiable—these were the type of policy levers associated with metrics that were 
easier to quantify, to collect, to code, and to regress. This is, after all, natural; it is far 
easier to quantitatively study criminal justice metrics (such as arrests, searches, 
convictions, or police force) than it is to study the long-term consequences of education, 
poverty-relief, or neighborhood trust.  
Other illustrations abound in other contexts. Here is an illustration from the clean 
air context: a study conducted by Daniel Klein titled “Fencing the Airshed: Using 
Remote Sensing to Police Auto Emissions,” and published in a collection called The 
Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues in 
we have presented here is further testimony to the paucity of formalized design procedures for translating 
security goals into detailed system requirements. The present crime situation has created an undeniable 
demand for quantitative models which can account for behavioral and sociological phenomena which can 
adequately predict the impact of security measures on society, and which can clarify our presently fuzzy 
notions of what security really means.”) Nevertheless, the City implemented the policies that topped 
Liechenstein’s study.   
145 “Golar Acts to Bolster Security in City Projects,” The New York Times, November 18th, 1971.  
146 Edward Ranzal, “Guards to be Hired to Protect Vest-Pocket Housing Projects,” The New York Times, 
April 18th, 1973. 
147 This was reflected well when, in 1971, New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy made 
public statements that courts “must accept the giant share of the blame” for the rise in city crime, arguing 
that “the courts let too many criminals go free and gave others sentences that were too light. He said the 
whole judicial system was lax, unjust, inefficient and ‘in bankruptcy.’” Eric Pace, “Murphy Indicts the 
Courts for Rise in City’s Crime,” The New York Times, December 21st, 1971. Murphy made news a little 
over a week later when he reorganized the police department to delegate the investigation of murders and 
robberies to “specialized squads.” Pace, Eric, “Murphy Revising Duties for 25,000,” The New York Times, 
December 30th, 1971. Criticisms of the court system were coupled with calls for tougher punishment. 
Judges were perceived as letting too many individuals get away with light sentences. Deputy Inspector 
William R. Bracy, at a Harlem task force meeting, complained that “My hands are tied by the court system. 
Many cases go out of the window because of the policy of judges in their ivory towers.” Rudy Johnson, 
“Police Problems Heard in Harlem,” The New York Times, January 18th, 1973. 




                                                                                                                                                                             
2003.149 The narrow objective in that study is to reduce pollution through lower auto 
emissions—again, the problem itself and the fact that it demands our attention and 
resources has been assumed. The analysis collects a number of alternative policies 
without much regard for the social implications of each, including “carpooling programs, 
emissions requirements on new cars, electric vehicle quotas, and alternative fuel 
mandates,” as well as emissions inspection testing.150 Notice that these have different 
valences, but that the alternatives are nevertheless made fungible. Most of these 
alternatives involve a command-and-control approach.  
According to the study, however, cost-benefit analysis reveals a more efficient 
alternative: policing auto emissions using “remote sensing” technology. The basic 
components of such an approach would include (1) manned and unmanned remote-
sensing units policing the highway, accompanied by automatic license plate readers; (2) 
monetary fines imposed on gross polluters, with the added sanction of vehicle 
impoundment; and (3) “on-road pullover teams” that would stop “on the spot” cars 
exhibiting “a suspicious feature,” “subterfuge or rank noncompliance.”151 Upon close 
analysis, the report finds that this latter alternative is indeed the most cost-efficient: 
“Besides offering lower costs, the remote-sensing approach delivers more air quality 
benefits than do smog check and other command-and-control policies.”152 So rather than 
regulate the auto industry or provide it with incentives to produce lower emission cars, or 
impose energy regulation, the optimal approach is to police the highways more. No need 
for licensed inspection stations, cumbersome regulation, or the like. Pullover teams and 
unmanned policing units will do the job better. “The likely result,” in Klein’s words, “is 
less bureaucracy and cleaner air.”153 
But notice, again, how the objective policy-machine here ends up having 
important effects on society and directly affects the balance of values such as liberty, 
equality, wealth distribution, civil rights, etc. The public policy analysis, it turns out, 
changes our environment—it shapes our society. In the Klein study, the country may be 
saddled with a far greater number of highway patrol officers, which may or may not 
reflect our values. (And of course, the political effects can go either way. The policy 
outcome could be single-payer universal health care, more public education or Head Start 
programs). In sum, by taking for granted the construction of the social problem, by 
choosing a narrow, quantifiable objective, by focusing on more measurable outcomes, 
149 Daniel Klein, “Fencing the Airshed: Using Remote Sensing to Police Auto Emissions,” in The Half-Life 
of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy, eds. Fred E. Foldvary and Daniel B. Klein. 
New York: New York University Press (2003).  
150 Klein, “Fencing the Airshed,” 2003, p. 103. 
151 Klein 2003, p. 98. 
152 Klein 2003, 102. 





                                                          
and by costing-out “fungible” policies, the systems analytic approach shapes our value 
system without ever having explicitly engaged in debate.  
B. Demonstration: A Simplified Proof 
Let me demonstrate the problems with the systems analytic approach using as 
simple and non-technical means as possible—to avoid an opaque model that itself may 
subtly insert assumptions in the premises of the analysis. I believe this can be done, or at 
least, that is my burden. This will require a few steps, given that the straightforwardness 
of the analysis may call for replies and rebuttals.   
a. A first cut: Distorting existing preferences 
Let’s say, hypothetically, that Americans in the aggregate would like to distribute 
their resources in line with their ideals in the following manner: 50% to education, 35% 
to health care, and 15% to policing. We could map their preferences for clarity (call them 
“utilities” if you prefer, or “budgets,” or “priorities,” and visualize these preferences by 
means of the following simple graph: 
Police  Health Care   Education 
     
15% 35% 50%
 
This distribution of goods corresponds, let’s say, to a certain weighting of social 
values that puts a priority first on an educated and healthy citizenry (let’s call this 
liberty), and secondly on security and orderliness (let’s call this order). Again, to keep it 
simple and take only two ideals, we could visualize the relationship as follows. The first 
values (the liberty associated with an educated and healthy citizenry) are, hypothetically, 
twice as important as the second set (orderliness and security): 





Now let’s say that we pick a social problem—for instance, crime or juvenile 
delinquency—and we decide to take a systems-analytic approach to the problem. As 
analysts, we would begin by choosing the corresponding narrow objective—here, 
reducing crime or juvenile delinquency—an objective that we can all agree on easily 
once the problem has been posited. We then collect the most promising alternatives to 
solve the problem. Let’s say, hypothetically, that there are three: (a) investing more in 




pregnant mothers, increasing drug rehabilitation programs, and investing in rapid 
response emergency room care; or (c) increasing the police force. These alternatives are 
entirely fungible, in the eyes of systems analysis. Then, we conduct detailed cost-benefit 
analysis and we find that a similar monetary investment will have the greatest return if 
the third policy, increasing the police force, is adopted. Based on the analysis, we 
increase the number of police officers and the police budget to address the social 
problem. Now, the distribution of political goods has changed, and our budget, or goods 
allocation, looks something like this: 
 
Police      Health Care        Education 
     
33% 33% 33%
 
The redistribution and reallocation of resources, of course, has consequences on 
what we are privileging in terms of ideals. We are now investing twice as much in 
policing than we were before, and this has the following consequence on the type of 
balance of ideals reflected in our society, with order and security now being 
proportionally more important than before: 




By putting aside debate over our values and ideals, and simply focusing on a 
narrow objective, systems analysis effectively has reshaped our social landscape and 
modified our prevailing values. It has distorted our original preferences and vision—it 
has altered the world that we want to live in.  
By contrast, a more capacious approach that addresses head-on our initial 
preferences would seek to keep the social values as the primary driver of policy 
interventions. That would translate, perhaps, in this case, into a combination of programs 
that would invest, say, 50% of resources into Head Start programs, 35% into emergency 
care improvement, and 15% into increased police—in order to maintain the balance of 
values as they were originally, to maintain the earlier balance.  
b. A second cut: Maximizing the wrong thing 
At this point, a proponent of systems analysis might respond that it would be easy 




account of people’s values. Let’s assume that, as a result of the increased investment in 
policing, overall social welfare may be lower than what we might have expected from the 
crime drop, because of a shared distaste for living in more of a police state; in other 
words, the benefits of reduced crime (or cleaner air in the Klein study) are offset to some 
degree by the change in police landscape. That, the proponent will say, can be factored 
into the analysis. The analyst need only include in the model the distaste (disutility) 
associated with the shift toward a police state. Preferences along these lines can also be 
measured and quantified, and made part of the overall welfare calculus. The problem, in 
other words, can be addressed easily by factoring in people’s tastes and preferences—
which should have been done from the beginning, in fact.  
Now, if we etch those preferences too deeply into the analysis, then we will 
simply be back at square one: We will weight our preferences so strongly that our values 
will determine policy outcomes. If the analysis is going to factor in our taste for police 
surveillance robustly—as well as all our other tastes for security, for order, for civil 
liberties, for equality, for an educated citizenry, and so on—then the model is essentially 
rigged to produce the outcomes that reflect our social values and judgments. The analysis 
will reproduce the landscape we want to see realized. What becomes unclear, then, is 
how deeply to etch our preferences into the model. But the degree of commitment to 
ideals, the strength of one’s convictions and values, can also be measured and included in 
the model, a proponent might reply. There is no reason to believe that preferences are 
etched in stone and that there can never be any trade-offs. A new social problem may 
have effects on the vision that we have for society.  
So, proponents of systems analysis might argue, after having incorporated those 
preferences into the model, a systems analytic approach can find real efficiencies that will 
actually result in increased welfare and greater utility overall. For instance, systems 
analysis might find efficiencies, say, by using police to address juvenile crime, that will 
outweigh the disutility and that would thereby allow us to invest savings into education 
and poverty-reduction. Even though there may be a shift in ideals, a proponent may 
argue, Americans will value the end state more. They will gain some orderliness 
proportionally to liberty, but will be happier overall based on their own tastes, 
preferences, or utilities.  
This is, of course, the welfare economist’s response—a type of response 
consistent, for example, with Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s thesis in Fairness 
versus Welfare (2002).154 In fact, Kaplow and Shavell say precisely this. As they write 
and emphasize, “The conception of individuals’ well-being that we consider, in the 
tradition of welfare economics, is a comprehensive one. It encompasses not only the 
direct benefits that individuals obtain from the consumption of goods and services, but 
also individuals’ degrees of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything 
154 Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 




                                                          
else that they value. What factors are included in well-being—and with what weight—is 
understood subjectively, in terms of what actually matters to individuals.”155  
As if anticipating the earlier critique, Kaplow and Shavell add: “An implication of 
our broad definition is that even tastes for fairness are included: Just as an individual 
might derive pleasure from art, nature, or fine wine, so might an individual feel better 
with the knowledge, for example, that vicious criminals receive their just deserts. This 
view, under which tastes for fairness are counted with a weight to be determined 
empirically, based on the actual weight, if any, that individuals place on such tastes, must 
be sharply distinguished from the view of notions of fairness as independent evaluative 
principles, which is the subject of our critique.”156 In other words, welfare economics can 
incorporate peoples’ tastes, preferences and values regarding social and political ideals—
and still optimize, i.e. shift policies around in order to find efficiencies that can be 
reinvested in other political ideals. 
This is undoubtedly right, at least at a theoretical level—or, at a minimum, I am 
perfectly willing to assume that it is right. But the problem is, even from a welfare 
economist’s perspective, that systems analysis is maximizing the wrong thing: it is trying 
to resolve one particular social problem, rather than trying to maximize general social 
welfare. In the process, there is absolutely no way to know whether the resolution of that 
particular systemic problem has increased or decreased overall welfare, or whether there 
are other policy alternatives regarding other social problems that would do better at 
promoting overall social welfare. In other words, from an internal perspective—internal 
to welfare economics—systems analysis is dangerous: it is trying to optimize the wrong 
objective. 
In this sense, it is not necessary to address the details of Kaplow and Shavell’s 
specific argument about law enforcement,157 because we can remain at a higher level of 
155 Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell, “Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, 
and Distributive Justice,” Journal of Legal Studies 32:331-362 (January 2003), at p. 332-333. 
156 Kaplow and Steve Shavell, “Fairness versus Welfare,” 2003, p. 333.  
157 I shall refrain from directly addressing the details of Kaplow and Shavell’s narrower argument as 
applied to the area of law enforcement (Welfare versus Fairness, p. 291-378) since it is not necessary to the 
discussion here. I will note, however, that Kaplow and Shavell base their discussion on the premise that 
“From the perspective of welfare economics, the central purpose of law enforcement is to reduce harmful 
activity” (id. at p. 292), and they suggest in their examples that the “best sanction” is one that deters 100% 
of individuals from committing crime (id. at p. 319). Even though they acknowledge that the social welfare 
evaluation should also include the cost of policing and punishing (id. at p. 292), they simplify that premise 
away (see id. at p. 318 n.48 “For convenience, we ignore the cost involved (to hire police and so forth) in 
achieving a probability of imposing punishment of 25 percent; because this cost will be held constant in our 
analysis, it will not affect any of the comparisons that we consider;” id. at p. 320 [ignoring punishment 
costs in welfare analysis but not fairness analysis]). As Gary Becker’s work emphasizes, though, the central 
purpose of law enforcement from a welfarist perspective does not differ from any other area and consists in 
maximizing social welfare, which does not involve “reducing harmful activity” but rather optimizing 
harmful activity: the question is to find the “right” or “efficient” number of rapes and murders, not to 
reduce them. See Gary S. Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard E. Harcourt, “Becker and Foucault on 




                                                          
abstraction. At that higher level, though, it is crucial not to engage in partial welfare 
analyses by focusing on one social system. That would simply distort overall welfare.158  
Another way to say this is that systems analysis does not address the question of 
how a particular social problem, or social system for that matter, becomes the focus of 
our problem-solving. The problem of crime was turned into a major national issue at a 
particular moment in history—in about 1964, during Barry Goldwater’s presidential 
campaign—and would become a key campaign issue for Richard Nixon. In part as a 
backlash to the Civil Rights movement, and for other reasons as well—including the rise 
of the anti-War and other social movements, racial conflict, and increased crime rates—
crime would become in the 1960s a social problem that would trump others—housing, 
poverty, public health, etc.159 But there was nothing natural or obvious about that. 
Illiteracy, malnourishment, poverty, racism, inequality, homelessness, etc. could also 
have remained or become more pressing social issues.  
In other words, we construct, we produce social problems, we render visible 
certain social issues, often through a crisis—and we keep invisible other social 
problems—in a way that then puts onto our counting table particular costs and benefits. It 
is in the production of problems as problems that we produce the possibility of shifting 
social values. We render visible one problem, while other problems remain invisible and 
illegible. In the process, we load the systems analysis with very specific concerns that 
have identifiable implications. We shape the balance of our ideals by means of problem 
creation. The only way to do systems analysis properly, without causing systemic 
Economics Research Paper No. 654. Kaplow and Shavell’s discussion lacks the hard-headedness of 
Beckers’ analysis of welfarism, and for that reason is perhaps a bit too simplistic; it does not address the 
hard case where, because of policing and punishing costs, the optimal welfarist position favors more rapes 
or murders than the fairness view. Their general theory of welfare versus fairness, however, is useful here.  
158 I believe that this exchange differs from the other critiques that have been leveled at Kaplow and 
Shavell’s argument; but need to triple check. See Howard F. Chang, “A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: 
Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle,” Yale Law Journal 110: 173–235 (2000) and “The Possibility of 
a Fair Paretian. Yale Law Journal 110: 251–58 (2000); Richard Craswell, “Kaplow and Shavell on the 
Substance of Fairness,” Journal of Legal Studies 32:245–75 (2003) (defending a mixed theory that 
privileges fairness in most cases); Michael B. Dorff, “Why Welfare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to 
Kaplow and Shavell,” Southern California Law Review 75: 847-99 (2002); Richard H. Fallon, “Should We 
All Be Welfare Economists,” Michigan Law Review 101:979 (2003); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Some 
Sound and Fury from Kaplow and Shavell,” Law and Philosophy 23:73-102 (2004); Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
“Preferences, Well-Being, and Morality in Social Decisions,” Journal of Legal Studies 32:303–29 (2003) 
(challenging the copious definition of well-being that includes fairness); Joseph William Singer, 
“Something Important in Humanity,” Harvard Civil Rights- Civil Liberties Law Review 37:103-130 (2002) 
(arguing that the authors define fairness improperly, creating a straw-man argument); Jeremy Waldron, 
“Locating Distribution,” Journal of Legal Studies 32:277–302 (2003) (challenging the line between 
distribution and the authors’ definition of fairness and calling for greater attention to the issue of 
distribution); Hamish, Stewart, “Persons and Their Well-Being: A Critical Discussion of Kaplow and 
Shavell’s Fairness Versus Welfare,” Queen’s Law Journal 30:1-34 (2004). 




                                                                                                                                                                             
distortion, is to do general welfare analysis at the highest and broadest level. Barring that, 
the analysis is inevitably going to insert error.160   
c. The Limited Role of Systems Analysis  
  Does that mean, in the end, that there is no role for systems analysis or 
operations research, or more generally cost-benefit analysis? No. There are a few roles, of 
course. First, there is an important role for program evaluation: Assessing the 
effectiveness of interventions remains, unquestionably, necessary. If programs are not 
contributing to a stated objective, that’s important information to have; for example, if 
broken-windows policing, stop-and-frisk policies, or gun-oriented policing are or are not 
reducing serious crime, it’s important to know in order to decide whether to engage in 
those enforcement practices.161 But, second, in terms of comparing programs, cost-
benefit comparisons should be limited to a single value dimension. When we compare 
different crime reduction alternatives, the alternatives have to be in the same register: 
whether, for instance, hot-spots policing works better than broken-window policing—that 
would be a fine question to ask.162 Whether to do 911-style policing or beat policing—
that, too, is okay. But whether to invest in the COPS program or in Head Start—that has 
to be off the table, because it is going to skew our balance of values. In other words, the 
economic cost-benefit analysis should be modeled on operations analysis, not systems 
analysis. Modeling, statistics, and cost-benefit analyses are fine in the operations research 
context. It is when they are extended outside of the narrow system being analyzed and 
encompass other social dimensions that the problems arise. Third, anything beyond the 
narrow category of operations research (narrowly defined) should be purely informational 
because it is, after all, skewed: the choice of a particular social problem and narrow 
objective is far too outcome-determinative. Under no circumstance should such cost-
160 In this regard, I tend to agree with the welfare economists: if you go down the path of welfare, it has to 
be total, not partial. But I confess that, in the end, I am not as democratic: there are certain values and ideals 
that I am not willing to give up, no matter what my fellow citizens prefer. For the welfare economist, it 
matters not whether the people’s preferences converge, say, on a fascistic outcome so long as it genuinely 
reflects well-being. That, I think, is a problem. Welfare analysis, in the end, also risks maximizing the 
wrong thing; and systems analysis surely does. They both should be maximizing our balance of political 
values, rather than either overall welfare or system functionality. The fact is, there is nothing preventing an 
efficiency-driven analysis from tending toward a purely authoritarian program. Hypothetically, the quest 
for perfect efficiency could lead us to a perfectly regimented, militaristic, fascist regime in which the 
benefits of efficiency outweigh the cost to political ideals among the citizenry. That, I take it, would 
undermine the very point of our political union. In the end, it’s a vision for society that we need to 
maximize, not the efficient embrace of fungible public policies. 
161 See, generally, Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, “Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control 
in New York’ in Bernard E. Harcourt ed., Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America (New York, NY: New 
York University Press, 2003); Debra Livingston, “Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public 
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,” 97 Columbia Law Review 551-672 (1997); Fagan on 
stop-and-frisk.     
162 Although, even here we need to be careful. Even within seemingly similar police operations, for 
instance, systems analytic evaluations may privilege those strategies that involve more easily quantifiable 




                                                          
benefit analysis determine the budget, the planning, or the long-term programming of 
social expenditures. Those are public decisions.  
The systems analyst may be entirely right that there is room for achieving Pareto-
optimality here or there; but in that regard, the systems analyst is tinkering at the margin, 
and narrow systems analysis—or rather, operations research—is no more than a 
technical, applied skill that corrects for minor inefficiencies that no one would disagree 
about or contest. In effect, operations research should be understood as nothing more than 
an applied program in an economics department—not a separate school or division of its 
own, and certainly not a broad approach to decision-making. In those limited terms, 
operations research has a lot to contribute.163 
In the end, the crux of the problem occurs when we expand operations research 
outside the discrete box where objectives and alternative policies overlap in values—or, 
to say the same thing, when we chose to compare alternative policies that encompass 
very different values. In operations research, the analysis focused on military objectives 
and alternative military policies that overlap with corresponding politico-military values, 
namely increased military security (offensive or defensive). The moment the analysis 
extends beyond a single dimension of values, the analysis inverts the relationship 
between policy and politics. 
 
V. THE PROBLEM IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
This critical perspective on systems analysis can inform our view of systems 
analytic styles of judicial decision-making in the field of criminal law and criminal 
procedure—along the same three dimensions. 
First, the judicial adoption of a systems analytic approach distorts the legal 
analysis by converting a particular practice into an objective necessity. It cloaks the 
judicial decision-making in an aura of neutrality and gives the impression that the legal 
determination is scientific and objective, rather than moral or normative. In the process, 
163 This is evident if one reads a range of useful and important studies that continue to be produced on 
technical topics, such as: Karl Inderfurth, “Risk and Safety Stock Management in Production Planning and 
Inventory Control with Stochastic Demand and Yield,” p. 277-292, or Rainer Kolisch, “Just-in-Time 
Production of Large Assemblies Using Project Scheduling Models and Methods,” p. 211-224, or Yeon-
Chen Liou et al., “A Stackelberg Equilibrium Model for Supply Chain Inventory Management,” p. 319-
338, all in Martin Morlock et al.. eds., Perspectives on Operations Research (Wiesbaden: Deutscher 
Universitäts-Verlag 2006); or Lawrence Bodin, et al., “Federal Express Sort Facility Employee Scheduling 
Problem,” p. 333-350, or Feiyue Li, et al., “The Noisy Euclidean Traveling salesman Problem: A 
Computational Analysis,” p. 247-270, both in Francis B. Alt, Michael C. Fu, and Bruce L. Golden, 
Perspectives in Operations Research (New York: Springer, 2006); or E. S. Lee and P.-F. Pai, “Operations 
Research in the Design of Cell Formation in Cellular Manufacturing Systems, p. 443-484, in J. C. Misra, 
ed., Uncertainty and Optimality: Probability, Statistics and Operations Research (New Jersey: World 




                                                          
the judicial decision imposes, by means of the practices or policy at issue, a particular 
balance of values and ideals. By achieving this under the guise of a systems analytic 
approach, the decision-makers mask the value choices that they are imposing.  
To take a concrete case, in McCleskey, discussed earlier, Justice Powell treats 
discretion as a necessary element for the proper functioning of the criminal justice 
system. Although the Court has not engaged sensu stricto in systems analysis—the Court 
has not identified or compared all the promising alternatives—it is ranking the 
discretionary practices in question as satisfying the system requirements, as satisfying the 
“criterion” of the model. In doing so, it is treating “the criminal justice system” as (1) 
having certain objective needs; (2) needs that can be determined neutrally, without 
recourse to moral or normative argumentation; (3) by means of an analysis that is not 
political in nature, but modeled on science. In McCleskey, the Court never admits that it 
is imposing particular social values or engaging in an analysis that involves political 
choices. In fact, the Court specifically severs the political dimension of the question by 
suggesting that McCleskey should address his argument to the political branches, not 
judicial decision-makers: “McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative 
bodies,” Justice Powell writes. The clear implication is that the systems analytic 
justification has avoided political or moral considerations. In Schlesinger’s words, it has 
dealt with reality, not with morality—though we know that is not true.  
Notice, importantly, that the systems analysis in McCleskey does not revolve 
predominantly around crime reduction. Justice Powell has not adopted Packer’s crime 
control model. The practices in question are not being measured along a criminological 
dimension. Rather, the question is whether the practices are necessary to the smooth 
functioning of the system. The objective is the functionality of the system—which 
essentially represents, for the Court, an objective or neutral stance. Having a functioning 
“criminal justice system” is, for the Court, an obvious and natural priority that does not 
seem to trigger an evaluation of social values or ideals. But what the technical 
examination of systems analysis reveals is that it is: the systems framework, the selection 
of a model, the evaluation along a criterion can shift the balance of values in society. And 
it does so precisely because all the different possible practices are not fungible substitutes 
that simply promote the system’s objectives or functionality. Practices and policies need 
to be evaluated in terms of how they are going to distribute and redistribute, or distort the 
balance of values that we share as a society. Those effects should not occur blindly or by 
the inadvertent effect of systems analysis.   
Second, judicial decision-making that rests on systems analytic approaches tends 
to select on the more quantifiable objectives and variables, such as crime control, 
management efficiency, or system functionality, at the expense of higher-order and softer 
social values, thus privileging the more measurable and instrumental factors.164 Here too, 
164 See, e.g., Carol Steiker, “Lessons From Two Failures: Sentencing For Cocaine And Child Pornography 
Under The Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States,” 76(1) Law & Contemporary Problems 27-




                                                          
in the context of the “criminal justice system,” those factors that can be measured more 
easily—crime related variables, arrest rates or convictions—will get priority over more 
qualitative or soft variables, such as racial equality. This is partially why, for instance, 
Packer’s due process model is a watered down version of systems analysis or may not 
even qualify. It is because those values of legality and fair notice are particularly difficult 
to quantify, producing a hybrid model that has very little “scientific” traction. It’s too soft 
to model. This is particularly problematic when we notice, with Malcolm Gladwell, that 
heterogenous rankings that aspire to be comprehensive are particularly amenable to 
distortion.165  
The Florence decision is, again, a good illustration. Justice Kennedy is able to and 
does quantify some of the security risks: “This record has concrete examples,” he writes. 
“Officers at the Atlantic County Correctional Facility, for example, discovered that a man 
arrested for driving under the influence had ‘2 dime bags of weed, 1 pack of rolling 
papers, 20 matches, and 5 sleeping pills’ taped under his scrotum.”166 The Justices debate 
a recent study of 75,000 new inmates over a five years period that found 16 instances 
where a full body search revealed contraband.167 By contrast, the liberty interests are far 
less tangible, and as a result, do not weigh equally in the systems analysis. Strip searches 
often include delousing showers, having to lift your genitals, and being forced to squat-
and-cough while someone is peering up you rectum or vagina: those liberty interests are 
less easily quantified than the raw number of successful searches, even when they are as 
low as 16/75,000. Florence is precisely a case where the more measurable, quantifiable, 
and instrumental factors associated with the harder social systems—here, the jail 
system—serve to tilt the analysis in a particular direction. The hard edge of systems 
analysis, as noted earlier, favors hard systems.   
Third, judicial decisions that rest on systems analytic justification tend to take for 
granted the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system as an overarching 
objective, thereby insulating the legal analysis from deeper critical inquiry. The approach 
starts, at the outset, by assuming a consensus surrounding the objective of the system—
for instance, promoting the functionality of the criminal justice system, or improving 
crime control, etc. The consequence is that there is little consideration of the larger 
question how the objectives of the “criminal justice system” relate to other social 
processes and values. Systems analytic approaches hinder a full debate over the larger 
consequences to society. The fact is, though, that taking for granted the objective of a 
White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work In Progress,” 76(1) Law & Contemporary Problems 
53-73 (2013) (discussing the quantification of loss amount in white collar sentencing). 
165 Malcolm Gladwell, “The Order of Things: What college rankings really tell us,” The New Yorker, 
February 14, 2011. 
166 Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1520-21 (2012).  
167 As Justice Breyer explains, “The record further showed that 13 of these 16 pieces of contraband would 
have been detected in a patdown or a search of shoes and outer-clothing. In the three instances in which 
contraband was found on the detainee’s body or in a body cavity, there was a drug or felony history that 




                                                                                                                                                                             
smooth functioning system of jails, of capital punishment, or of mass incarceration in this 
country today is itself a position that requires justification.  
In the judicial decision-making context, there is another more common critique of 
systems analytic approaches that applies as well—namely, that the decision makers do 
not necessarily have the skills, background, knowledge, or time to really implement the 
type of quantitative analysis necessary to decipher the best alternative, so they tend to 
guesstimate or “satisfice” and, in the process, simply confirm their personal biases. This 
is the critique expressed by scholars such as Charles Lindblom, who would coin the idea 
that policy makers just “muddle through,” and Herbert Simon, who coined the term 
“satisfice.”168 These are the critique surrounding the problem of bounded rationality. 
While they are undoubtedly correct,169 it is nevertheless important to also focus on the 
internal critique that starts by assuming, with the proponents of systems analytic 
approaches, that the method itself can be properly applied. 
 
VI. A CODA ON MODERN PUNISHMENT PRACTICES:  
THE CASE OF MASS INCARCERATION 
 
The problem in the area of crime and punishment is, of course, much larger than 
the narrow issue of judicial decision-making based on a systems analytic approach. The 
problem goes far deeper, and entails far more troubling social outcomes. Punishment 
practices more generally, today, are often operationalized through a systems analytic 
approach: we tend to approach these matters from the perspective of a “criminal justice 
system,” with its objectives and needs (e.g. crime reduction, population management, 
etc.), and then pursue policies that most efficiently advance those objectives. In the 
process, we ignore many other important dimensions.  
Mass incarceration—or more appropriately, the hyper-incarceration of inner-city, 
minority young men—is a tragic example of this. To be sure, it is the product of a 
complex interaction of micro- and macro-level factors including national and local 
politics, sentencing reforms, racial discrimination, perceptions of crime, and special 
168 See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior 88, 118-22 (4th ed., 1997); Charles Lindblom, “The 
Science of Muddling Through,” 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959); Charles E. Lindblom, “Still Muddling, 
Not Yet Through,” 39 Pub. Admin. Rev. 517 (1979); generally Rubin, p. 38-39. 
169 See, e.g., Nate Silver, “In Supreme Court Debate on Voting Rights Act, a Dubious Use of Statistics,” 






                                                          
interest lobbying, over the course of forty years.170 But systems analysis facilitated the 
phenomenon, especially at the level of ideas and justification.  
The theory of “selective incapacitation”—which would morph into mass 
incarceration—was originally theorized by the RAND Corporation and developed 
precisely as a systems “fix” to the excessive cost of the prison system. A few years after 
the New York City RAND Institute closed its doors, in the early 1980s, RAND 
established the Habitual Offender Project. That project would focus on the strategy of 
“selective incapacitation” as a new and promising, cost-effective measure to combat 
crime.  
The idea of selective incapacitation was premised on the empirical observation 
that a limited number of offenders tend to commit a disproportionally large percentage of 
offences. If true, and if those individuals could be identified, then in theory it would be 
efficient to focus on those high-rate offenders and imprison them for longer terms, rather 
than incarcerate low-rate offenders. The RAND project originated in response to studies 
of California prisons that revealed, surprisingly, no real differences in prison sentences as 
between low and high rate offenders. The idea behind the RAND project was to 
efficiently reshuffle inmate sentencing: By locking up high-rate offenders for longer 
periods, a state could both reduce its crime rate and simultaneously decrease its prison 
population. The policy promised budgetary savings and reduced crime. 
Peter Greenwood, with Allan Abrahamse, issued a RAND report in 1982 that set 
forth the most fully articulated plan for implementing the strategy of selective 
incapacitation.171 Titled “Selective Incapacitation,” the report began as follows: “The 
American system of criminal justice is now at a crossroad. Deprived of rehabilitation as 
an organizing theme, pressed by a fearful and dissatisfied public to provide greater 
protection from violent crimes, saddled with dangerously overcrowded and decrepit 
prisons, and facing the prospect of severely limited resources to carry out its functions, 
the justice system is now searching for new ways to control crime.”172 The report studied 
the feasibility of one such new way: predicting future dangerousness in order to impose 
lengthier sentences on habitual offenders. The study then tried to estimate the cost-
effectiveness of selecting on dangerousness.  
The researchers based their prediction research on self-report surveys from 2,100 
male prison and jail inmates from California, Michigan and Texas in 1977.173 They 
focused on robbery and burglary offenses, excluding more serious crimes such as murder 
or rape (given that low-base-rate crimes are so much more difficult to predict) and 
170 Michael Campbell and Heather Schoenfeld, “The Transformation of America’s Penal Order: A 
Historicized Political Sociology of Punishment,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 118, No. 5 (March 
2013), pp. 1375-1423. 
171 Peter W. Greenwood, with Allan F. Abrahamse,  Selective incapacitation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corp and National Institute of Justice (U.S.) 1982, p. xx and 92.  
172 Greenwood et al., Selective incapacitation, 1982, p. vii. 




                                                          
developed a seven factor test to identify high-rate offenders (focusing primarily on prior 
criminal record, history of drug abuse, and employment history). They assigned each 
offender a score from zero through seven: a positive response on any one of these seven 
factors resulted in one point on the offender’s score. The resulting score was used to 
distinguish between low, medium or high rate offenders. When the researchers tested 
their predictions, they found that their test identified low- and medium-rate offenders 
with greater ability than high-rate offenders:  91 to 92 percent of those scoring 0 or 1—
the lowest possible scores—turned out to be low- or medium-rate offenders; by contrast, 
only 50 percent of those scoring 5, 6 or 7 turned out to be high-rate burglars or 
robbers.174  
Despite the poor results, Greenwood concluded the study on an up-beat note:  
“Increasing the accuracy with which we can identify high-rate offenders or increasing the 
selectivity of sentencing policies can lead to a decrease in crime, a decrease in the prison 
population, or both. Selective incapacitation is a way of increasing the amount of crime 
prevented by a given level of incarceration.”175 Even though Greenwood found that 
predicting future dangerousness was inexact—and five years later would revise the report 
and issue it with a slightly different title: “Selective incapacitation revisited: why the 
high-rate offenders are hard to predict”176—Greenwood nevertheless painted an 
optimistic picture from what were not very cost-efficient conclusions: 
Among California robbers, we found that a selective incapacitation strategy that 
reduced terms for low- and medium-rate robbers while increasing terms for high-
rate robbers could achieve a 15 percent reduction in the robbery rate with only 95 
percent of the current incarcerated population level for robbery. An unselective 
attempt to increase incapacitation effects by increasing terms for all robbers 
equally requires a 25 percent increase in population to bring about the same 15 
percent reduction in crime. Among burglars, the best selective policy required a 7 
percent increase in prison population to bring about a 15 percent reduction in 
crime.  
In Texas, we found that additional incapacitation effects would be much 
more expensive. For robbers it would require a 30 percent increase in 
incarceration level to achieve a 10 percent reduction in crime. For burglars, a 15 
percent increase in incarceration would be required to achieve a 10 percent 
reduction in crime. This higher cost is due to the low offense rate among Texas 
inmates.177 
174 Greenwood et al., Selective incapacitation, 1982, p. 53. 
175 Greenwood et al., Selective incapacitation, 1982, p. xiii. 
176 Peter W. Greenwood and Susan Turner,. (1987). Selective incapacitation revisited : why the high-rate 
offenders are hard to predict. Santa Monica: RAND and National Institute of Justice (U.S.), 1987. 




                                                          
A close reading of these conclusions reveals that the crime reduction benefits 
required—in three out of four cases—increased prison populations. In effect, the idea of 
selective incapacitation had already morphed into the theory of mass incapacitation. 
Nevertheless, the Greenwood report had high impact and contributed importantly to the 
rise and theoretical prominence of incapacitation theory, which undergirded a massive 
increase in prison populations in the United States.178 The report was inducted into the 
operations research cannon of criminal justice—as least, according to Blumstein. In the 
group of OR missionaries, Peter Greenwood featured prominently.179 
Greenwood’s study, though, smacked more of systems analysis than operations 
research—which was precisely the problem. It focused on a narrow objective and then 
evaluated one particular policy alternative that clearly had a distinct political valence, 
without addressing the politics. It is precisely these kinds of systems analysis approaches 
that are dangerous, because, in narrowing in on a consensus objective, they set aside an 
open and frank debate about our values and ideals. The analysis miserably failed to 
consider all of the negative consequences that the practice entailed—and this blindness 
has continued to plague the topic of mass incarceration. To take but one: the toll on 
citizenship. There is practically no consideration, today, for what mass incarceration does 
to the civic engagement of the more than 2.2 million persons held behind bars or to the 
more than 7 million persons under correctional supervision. Amy Lerman and Vesla 
Weaver have begun to document some of the more measurable effects of incarceration on 
public citizenship. They have shown how contact with the correctional system reduces 
participation in democratic politics and carries with it a “substantial civic penalty”: it 
produces a large, negative effect on “turning out to vote, involvement in civic groups, and 
trusting the government,” taking into account the possibility of selection bias.180 But even 
here, the studies only consider the more tangible effects, and one can only wonder about 
the much broader impact of such a massive prison system on the democratic citizenship 
of large segments of our communities.   
This is not to suggest that systems analysis caused mass incarceration—nor to 
suggest that there are no evidence-based systems analytic strategies that could help 
reduce mass incarceration today. The point, instead, is that systems analytic approach do 
not take a sufficiently holistic approach to society and tend—I emphasize, tend—to focus 
the analyst too narrowly on systems’ objectives. So, for instance, today, in the context of 
decarceration, too many of the outcome-based systems analytic programs focus on the 
release of inmates with low propensities for “dangerousness,” without examining how the 
prediction of future dangerousness is coded for race and how these solutions skew even 
further the racial imbalance in corrections. Similarly, the evidence-based systems analytic 
strategies focus on the reduction of recidivism, when in fact, it is extremely hard to 
178 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Against prediction : profiling, policing, and punishing in an actuarial age. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 88-92. 
179 Blumstein, 2007, p. 22; for a review of OR contributions to the criminal justice system, see Maltz 1994. 
180 Vesla Weaver and Amy Lerman, “Political Consequences of the Carceral State,” American Political 




                                                          
realistically affect recidivism. Instead of focusing so intensively on reducing 
recidivism—the system’s primary focus—it may well be better, rather, to focus on 
whether these programs reduce the very high likelihood that a reentering convict 
overdoses or dies. The statistics here are frightening. But those, of course, are not viewed 
as system needs, and so they do not rank high on the outcome metrics. Could we get it 
right one day and do systems analysis better? Anything is possible, of course, but the 
honest answer is: only if we can manage higher-level welfare analysis and do not remain 




Extending the method of operations research beyond weapons systems and into 
broader policy contexts and judicial decision-making has been “radical,”181 to borrow 
Edward Quade’s term—radical precisely for the reasons that Quade and his RAND 
colleagues suggested: the approach takes no position on the relative worth of very 
different kinds of practices that promote very different kinds of social values. Quade’s 
pregnant remark that “education, antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum 
clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile delinquency”182 reveals the nub 
of the problem. The simplicity of the statement exposes the central fault: the systems 
analytic approach ingeniously displaces larger debate over the values that we hold as a 
society. Systems analysis is an approach that seduces by offering the hope of avoiding the 
quagmire of partisanship or, in Schlesinger’s words, “morality,” and by focusing our 
attention on narrow objectives that no one could possibly object to—reducing crime or 
juvenile delinquency, for instance. It cunningly proposes a disarmingly common sense, 
neutral, and objective approach. Rather than get caught up in endless debates, we need 
simply agree on more basic, measurable objectives (with an appreciation of resource 
constraint), evaluate the different alternative ways of achieving those narrow objectives, 
and then choose the most efficient alternative.  
The systems analytic approach, however, masks rather than avoids value 
judgments. It does so by privileging and rendering natural certain systems interests, while 
ignoring the consideration of other social values. And it is at its worst when it stops 
conversation: when it serves to stop the legal discussion short and prevent countervailing 
values from ever get named or weighed in the analysis. In the end, the problem with 
systems analytic approaches is that they do not sufficiently account for all the non-
systematic dimensions of the criminal sanction. Taking a systems analytic approach that 
focuses on management efficiency, crime control, system functionality—or for that 
matter, on family well-being or liberal legalism—is likely to produce judicial decisions 
that fail to recognize and account for multiple and important social values. Robust 
181 Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2. 




                                                          
citizenship, for instance, may simply fall by the way side because it is not easily 
quantifiable.  
In the end, the evolution from operations research to systems analysis, the 
extension of systems analysis into government policy-making and, ultimately, into the 
“criminal justice system,” and the contemporary effects on judicial decision-making and 
legal thought are plagued with difficulties. The approach is seductively simple and 
appealing, but it is an approach that maximizes the wrong thing—purportedly fungible 
practices, rather than our shared values and ideals. 
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